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2. Introduction 
2.1. Subject Presentation 
The main concern of this project is how certain values and norms have been expressed in speeches by the 
American Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush in the time span 1990-2003 
regarding involvement in Iraq. This paper will investigate if the concept of “Civilizations” by Samuel P. 
Huntington’s has played a role in the creation of the belief system of the Presidents. This issue needs to be 
addressed in order to create awareness of the Presidents values and beliefs regarding Iraqi affairs and 
possible political subsystems influencing the American foreign policy making process. 
2.2. Problem Area 
The motivation for this project stems from a general interest in the American political system, a system that 
is diverse from the Danish one. A curiosity towards the American foreign policy and how America – as a 
nation state – acts towards foreign threats and conflicts also added to the shaping of this project. 
Experiencing a world with America as the world’s sole superpower, and where all the American decisions in 
global politics influenced many other nations, created an interest within this field.  
Being introduced to Samuel P. Huntington’s theory on International Relations “The Clash of Civilizations” in 
High School, and thus knowing about his theory, further fueled the motivation for this project and at the 
same time helped profile the outline of the project additionally. America’s involvement during the past 20 
years in the Middle East, and Iraq specifically, combined with our familiarity of Huntington’s thesis, led to a 
curiosity towards whether or not his thesis could be traced in the American foreign policy. 
Throughout the history of mankind, armed conflicts have always been present. These conflicts have played 
a significant role in how our world has been shaped, and is being shaped. During the past century major 
conflicts, as World War I and World War II, have had substantial impact on the entire world.  
Before 1991, where the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved, conflicts had had a clear definition 
of who was the enemy, and conflicts were based in the struggles between nation states. The world was 
divided in East and West with the Soviet Union on one side and the USA on the other.  Every country in the 
world had to choose an ally in the conflict, and thereby dividing the entire world.    
After 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union left the USA as the unipol. Old definitions of “the enemy” now 
had to be replaced, and the struggle for power in this new world order could begin.  
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It was in this situation Samuel P. Huntington, a political scientist and professor at Harvard University, 
offered his view on International Relations. Huntington proclaimed that conflicts in the ”new world” would 
be of cultural – not ideological or economic – character. This claim have been one of the most influential 
and widely discussed1. Huntington is an important key figure in this project due to his significant 
contribution in the field of political development and politics of less developed societies and his extensive 
knowledge about US and comparative politics2. 
In his thesis “The Clash of Civilizations”, which was first presented in 1992 at a Bradley lecture3, Huntington 
attempts to explains that the world can now be divided into seven or eight civilizations4; and the most 
dangerous conflicts will, in the post-Cold War world, be the ones that are between these different 
civilizations, that all have major differences in terms of culture and religion5. As culture is related to values, 
according to Huntington6, these become important as well and play an important role in Huntington’s 
concept, as he puts a lot of emphasis on culture.  
The civilizations that Huntington divides the world into are: Western, Latin American, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, 
Orthodox, and Japanese and possible African, which he is not quite sure should be recognized as a 
civilization7.  
According to Huntington, the West is the most powerful civilization, and will continue to be, although its 
power is declining8.  Because of the decline, the West will try to protect its interests and assert its values. 
According to Huntington, some civilizations will join or try to emulate them, but others will attempt to 
expand their own economic and military power to resist the West. According to Huntington, one of the 
civilizations that will try to “resist” the West is the Islamic civilization9. 
                                                          
1
 Heywood, Andrew, Politics Third Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 136 
2
 Heywood, Andrew, 2007, p. 138 
3
 Appendix 8 
4
 Huntington, Samuel P., ”The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order” 2002, p29 
5
 Huntington, Samuel P., ”The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order” 2002, p28-30 
6
 Huntington, Samuel P., 2002 p. 42 
7
 Huntington, Samuel P., ”The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order” 2002, p 45-47 
8
 Huntington, Samuel P., ”The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order” 2002, p 29 
9
 Huntington, Samuel P., ”The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order” 2002, p 29 
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Since the Cold War, the United States has been viewed as the main representative of the Western 
civilization, especially in terms of military and economic power. Since Iraq is a part of the Islamic civilization, 
according to Huntington10, it is a civilization that might be in conflict with the United States from the 
Western civilization. Therefore this paper finds it relevant to investigate the conflicts between the United 
States and Iraq, and try to investigate if Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations” had a part in making the 
discourse surrounding to conflicts. This project only focuses on the conflicts between the United States and 
Iraq from the perspective of Huntington, and therefore acknowledges that there are numerous of other 
ways to view the particular conflicts.  
This will be done by doing a case study of three speeches by the three different Presidents that were in 
office from 1990 to 2003; George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush. 
This paper will also, by using Sabatier´s Advocacy Coalition Framework, investigate the three Presidents 
belief system, in relation to the specific armed conflicts with Iraq, and try to examine if it is possible to find 
signs that Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations” has had a part in the making of these belief systems.  
 
2.3. Problem Definition 
How does Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”, ultimately based on values, relate to the belief systems 
and discourses formed by the three Presidents expressed in the speeches by George H.W. Bush, William J. 
Clinton and George W. Bush?  
2.4. Research Questions 
The problem definition has led to the following research questions: 
- What is the theory outline of Samuel P. Huntington´s “The Clash of Civilizations” 
- Do the three Presidents express a discourse that can be related Huntington´s concept of 
“Civilizations”?  
- Do the belief system of the three Presidents, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. 
Bush, contain an understanding of the concept of “Civilizations” by Huntington, and was Huntington 
a part of a political subsystem influencing the three Presidents belief system? 
 
                                                          
10
 Huntington, Samuel P., ”The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order” 2002, p 27 
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2.5. Method and Design Rapport 
2.5.1. Introduction  
In this chapter of the project all the different aspects of the methods will be explained and serve as a 
foundation for the analyses following this chapter. This chapter outlines the design of the later chapters 
and why they are relevant in order to answer the problem definition. 
A paragraph will be devoted to the explanation of the chosen methods in this project. The paragraph will 
discuss the use of case study as a method of approach. This paragraph will further on discuss the 
disadvantages of such a method. Then a paragraph will explain how the method of discourse analysis is 
used and why. 
The choice of literature serves as an introduction to the later section about theories and will briefly explain 
the choices made and the use of the literature. Following this section the choice of theories will be 
presented.  
Finally a paragraph will account for possible mistakes and uncertainties that may occur in the project. This 
will serve as a self-criticism and as an evaluation of the methods used in the project. 
 
2.5.2. Choices and Restrictions 
For this project the original intention was to investigate American foreign policy in a Middle Eastern 
country. Due to the heavy involvement of America in the Middle East a choice of country to investigate was 
difficult. The choice of Iraq proved ideal support to our main interest in American Foreign policy, because 
America has been involved in Iraqi affairs and have taken military action against Iraq on numerous 
occasions.  
Other choices that had to be made were the choice of theories. The theories of Samuel P. Huntington were 
a natural choice. His theory outline has had vast influence on the understanding of the concept of 
“Civilization” and is used in International Politics. Furthermore the theories of Lars E. Andersen will be used 
to do a comparison with and give critique of Huntington’s theories. 
These theories will be applied in this project through the use of discourse analysis. This type of analysis 
makes it possible to detect how the Presidents discursively understand the role of America, and how they 
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understand the concept of “Civilizations” as defined by Huntington and if this understanding relates to 
Huntington´s understanding of civilization.  
For the last part of the project Paul A. Sabatier’s theories about Advocacy Coalition Framework will serve a 
base for the investigation of the three Presidents belief system, and further analyse and discuss the 
connection with Huntington´s understanding of civilizations. Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework 
theory contains other theories as well, but the chosen three creates a basis for the understanding which 
this project needs.  
 
 
2.5.3. Design of Chapters 
The chapters will be structured with an individual introduction, main part and overall conclusion and 
summary of the chapter.   
Chapter 1: 
The first chapter will examine Huntington’s theories and discuss his validity. It is necessary to outline 
Huntington first, because his theories are the basis of the later discourse analyses in chapter two and will 
be used in relation to Sabatier’s theories in chapter three. The chapter will start with a general evaluation 
of his career and life. The outlining of his “Civilization” concept takes off in the paradigms and his definition 
of civilizations and culture. Lastly the chapter processes and discusses critical articles debating points in 
Huntington’s concept. 
Chapter 2: 
This chapter will investigate through the use of discourse analysis how the three Presidents (George H. W. 
Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush) express a relation to Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”. 
The use of discourse is relevant due to the fact that this enables a deeper investigation of the articulation 
of the Presidents. Hereby it can be detected whether the use of Huntington’s concept of “Civilization” is 
used by the Presidents or not. The chapter will contain analysis of speeches held by the previously 
mentioned Presidents. Each of the speeches has been analysed with a focus on Huntington’s concept of 
“Civilization”. Furthermore a comparison of the viewpoints expressed in the speeches in relation to 
Andersen’s theories will be included.  
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Chapter 3: 
The last chapter will examine Huntington’s academic and political background and whether it is possible to 
detect if Huntington have been part of a political subsystem that may have influenced the Presidents’ 
foreign policy concerning Iraq or not. Furthermore an analysis of each of the President’s speeches will be 
made with a focus on their belief system. The purpose of these analyses is to locate the Presidents 
different deep (normative) and near (policy) cores and to discuss if these believes may reflect Huntington’s 
concept of “Civilization”.  
 
2.5.4. Choice of Methods 
2.5.4.1. Case Study 
This project will be using a case study approach. This approach has been chosen mainly due to the short 
timespan available to write this project and because it enables the project to elaborate more broadly on 
the focus point of this project. The case study is a method which uses practical examples to analyse a 
research problem. These isolated examples needs to hold the complexity of the research question11. A 
clear advantage for choosing the method of case study is when it is needed to cover a single issue in a 
short amount of time. Furthermore it is possible to focus on details which a broader approach would not 
be able to examine. By combining this method with a discourse analysis of three speeches it is possible to 
get a broader perspective on the possible influence of Huntington displayed in the speeches. On the other 
hand using a case study increases the risk of examining too narrow of a field in relation to the problem 
definition. Further on the focus on the details may hinder a broader perspective and thus increases the risk 
of losing focus.  
 
2.5.4.2. Discourse Analysis 
In this project discourse analysis will be used as one of the methods. By using discourse analysis it is 
investigated how the different Presidents, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, have 
perceived the cultural division in the world.  
                                                          
11
 Olsen, Poul B, Pedersen, Kaare, Problem-Oriented Project Work – A Workbook, Roskilde University Press, 2008, p. 309 
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In “Classical and Modern Social Theory”12 the practice of discourse analysis is described as “Discourse 
analysis strives to define the concept of discourse as certain form of practice through which language 
actors and types of behavior connect to one another”13.  
There are several ways of doing discourse analysis and many sociologists have defined different 
approaches and focuses, but in this project an emphasis on Michel Foucault's definition of discourse will be 
used.  
Foucault sees discourses as “autonomous systems of rules that constitute objects, concepts, subjects and 
strategies, thereby governing the production of scientific statements.”14 The discourse will thereby, 
according to Foucault, become “tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations”15 which 
serves the purpose of aiding the speaker to “advance their interests and projects”16. Furthermore Foucault 
uses his term of archaeology to describe political knowledge as a measuring tool to “show whether the 
political behavior of a society, a group, or a class is not shot through with a particular, describable 
discursive practice”17. This implies an investigation of the use of various concepts (objects, enunciative 
modalities, concepts and strategies) within “political activity”18 and whether these are “discursively 
constructed”19. 
Foucault´s theories about discourses are relevant in this project because he sees a speech as a force 
relation between the speaker and the audience. So when the President gives a speech it is an execution of 
power towards the audience, where the President have the power to influence the audience through the 
speech by using different discourses, that represent the President’s viewpoints. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Andersen, H, Kaspersen, Lars B, Classical and Modern Social Theory, Blackwell Publishing, 2007 
13
 Andersen, H, Kaspersen, Lars B, 2007, p. 164 
14
 Howarth, David, Discourse, Open university Press, 2000, p.48-49 
15
 Howarth, David, 2000, p. 48-49 
16
 Howarth, David, 2000, p. 49 
17
 Howarth, David, 2000, p. 60 
18
 Howarth, David, 2000, p. 60 
19
 Howarth, David, 2000, p. 60 
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2.5.5. Choice of Literature 
The project will not feature much empirical data. Instead the main data is the speeches of the Presidents. 
Due to the lack of other empirical data the speeches will be used in several analyses.  
 
2.5.5.1. Samuel P. Huntington 
“Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”  
Samuel P. Huntington presented his theory of “The Clash of Civilizations” in 1996 in a book of the same 
name20. Huntington was very active and held many positions in public and political offices. His theory is 
expanding on the concepts of different civilizations and how they will interact in a global community.  
The reason why Huntington’s book ”Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” have been 
chosen in this project is because the project will be based on Huntington’s concept of “Civilization”. 
 
2.5.5.2. Dissident Voice 
The online newsletter Dissident Voice was founded by Sunil K. Sharma and consists of freelance journalists 
and intellectuals. The site claims to fight injustice and inequality by providing provoking and expressive 
articles that forces the reader to reconsider certain elements in the society.  
The dissident Voice has been chosen because certain articles heavily criticize Huntington’s “Civilizations” 
and therefore proves as a useful tool to discuss these theories. 
 
2.5.5.3. Lars Erslev Andersen 
“Den amerikanske orden”  
Lars E. Andersen is currently a senior researcher at DIIS21 and holds several Master degrees in history of 
ideas and Middle East Studies. In 2003 he published a book, “Den amerikanske orden”, in which he 
                                                          
20
 Appendix 4 
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develops the different civilizational strategies upon which the Presidents from Roland Regan to George W. 
Bush have perceived and handled international issues in relation to the concepts of security and 
civilization. 
In this project the strategies will be used as a comparison to Huntington’s concept of “Civilization” and the 
Presidents’ approach to the “Civilization” concept.  Andersen outlines three civilization strategies that can 
be applied to each of the three Presidents. 
 
2.5.5.4. Paul A. Sabatier  
“An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning 
Therein”  
In 1988 Paul A. Sabatier first wrote about the Advocacy Coalition Framework. It was developed for the 
purpose to combine different approaches within policy making by taking the impact of belief systems into 
account22.  
The article has a much wider scope then used in this project were only the concepts of political subsystem, 
advocacy coalition and belief system. The Sabatier´s theory is relevant for the project because it will be 
possible to analyse the belief systems of the three presidents depicted in their speeches. Moreover will this 
theory be used to investigate if it will be possible to answer the question, whether an actor in a political 
subsystem is able to influence a policy making system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
21
 Danish Institut for International Studies 
22
 Heywood, Andrew p. 429 
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2.5.6. Choice of speeches  
In addition to the chosen literature come the three speeches which will serve as a basis for the later 
chapters about the discourse analysis and Advocacy Coalition Framework analysis.  
Since the analysis will be based on a case study, it will be relevant to analyze the speeches through a 
narrow view on different components. 
The following three speeches have been chosen: 
 “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress” (September 11th, 1990) by George H. W. Bush, 
  “Transcript President Clinton explains Iraq strike. “(December 16th, 1998) by William J. Clinton  
 “President Bush announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq have ended” (May 1st, 2003) by 
George W. Bush. 
These speeches have been chosen because of a number of significant factors. First of all, the speeches have 
all been given by American Presidents in the time period 1990-2003. Secondly, all the speeches address 
American involvement in Iraq. The character of the involvement in Iraq is different, but all the speeches 
contain discourses that seem to express a relation to Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations”.  
As the speeches implies the Presidents hold very different opinions concerning the Middle East, and how to 
handle conflicts in this region. 
The speeches will be used to investigate if Huntington's concept of “Civilization” that is present in the 
speeches and thereby it is possible to detect how they perceive - or even acknowledge - other civilizations 
like Huntington´s Islamic civilization.  
With an analysis that focuses on the belief system of the different Presidents the speeches will show a 
broader perspective on Huntington’s influence on the process of policy making. 
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2.5.7. Choice of theories 
2.5.7.1. Samuel P. Huntington 
Samuel P. Huntington presented his theory of ”The Clash of Civilizations” after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. For Huntington it was increasingly important to stress that different 
civilizations would be so different, due to cultural and religious norms and values that they would clash 
with each other. To aid this theory Huntington presented a number of paradigms developed by others. The 
four he uses are:  
 One World: Euphoria and Harmony which states that the Cold War was the end of conflicts in 
global politics.  
 Two Worlds: Us and Them which implies that the world is divided by an ”us and them” idea.  
 184 states, More or Less implies that the nation states of the world are the most important 
actors.  
 Sheer Chaos states that nation states are getting weaker, governments are losing authority, and 
there is an intensification of ethnic and religious conflicts, international mafias and terrorism.  
All of these paradigms have been used to build up to Huntington’s thesis which claims that the world 
consists of seven or eight civilizations based on culture. Huntington sees culture and religion, rather than 
ideology, as the two main factors when dividing the world into civilizations.  
An elaboration of Huntington’s theory and his perception of the concept of „Civilization” will be made in 
chapter 1 where a further discussion and criticism of this concept will be made. 
 
2.5.7.2. Lars Erslev Andersen 
In his book „Den amerikanske orden” (2003) Lars E. Andersen developed three civilization strategies. These 
strategies were built upon how the Presidents from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush had perceived 
international security and civilization. The tree strategies are:  
 Civilizational-indifferent Strategy which completely ignores the concept of civilizations and cultural 
differences. Cultural values are not a concept that has a place neither in this strategy nor in the 
security politics and power relations of Presidents using this strategy. The national security is 
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achieved through deterrence and containment, and with an emphasis on international cooperation 
and alliances.23 
 Civilizational-conservative Strategy looks upon different civilizations as enemies that can never be 
united, and therefor principally are threats to one another. This civilizational strategy has the same 
base as the concept “Civilization” developed by Samuel P. Huntington: civilizations are different 
and can only coexist if they are not in direct competition over power, resources or values. But if 
there is a conflict between the civilizations the only way to survive is by destroying the other.24 
 Civilizational-promotional Strategy regards the world as one big civilization, where peace is an 
achievable utopia that can be met through dialog and respect for human rights. This strategy sees 
differences as cultural and religious differences that doesn´t prevent the possibility for dialog and 
community.25 
In this project, the strategies will be used as a comparison/critique of Huntington’s concept of 
“Civilizations”. Based on the analysis of the speeches, it will be investigated if Andersen’s strategies 
support or overturn Huntington’s concept. It will be done, by matching the strategies to the Presidents, 
based on the discourse analysis outcome. 
 
2.5.7.3. Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Developed by Paul A. Sabatier, this framework tries to explain the different parts of the policy making 
process, and the actors influencing the process, and policy learning. However, this project will only focus 
on three of these theories, namely belief system, political subsystems and advocacy coalition framework. 
This is relevant for the project in the sense that after analysing the framework it will be possible to answer 
the question of whether one actor, in this project Samuel P. Huntington, is able to influence the policy 
making process and it will supply give the knowledge about which factors that influences the policy making 
process. 
 
                                                          
23
 Andersen, Lars E., Den amerikanske orden, 2003, p. 48 
24
 Andersen, Lars E., Den amerikanske orden, 2003 p 48 
25
 Andersen, Lars E., ”Den amerikanske orden”, 2003  p62-64 
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2.5.8. Self-criticism 
This project features a large number of uncertainties which may play a vital role in the outcome of the 
project. First of all, the paper investigates the processes of foreign policy of three American Presidents. This 
means that it is nearly impossible to have full access to elements that have helped shaped these views and 
what factors were behind the decisions of the President’s and their Administrations. It may only be possible 
to access 5% of what actually was influential, as there are always actions that take place behind the 
curtains, which will never be fully investigated. This leaves a huge margin of error as Huntington may not 
have been part of a subsystem close to the Presidents, as well as the belief system of these President may 
have been different.  
The choice of case study also adds to the uncertainties. The project only examines one speech per 
President, which means that the whole foreign policy of that particular President will be generalized based 
on that one speech. This margin of error have been taken into consideration, but analyzing different 
Presidents doing similar situations may give a broader perspective of the more general foreign politics of 
American Presidents in the period 1990-2003. To eliminate this margin of error it would require that a 
number of analyses would have to be made with the same President in mind. But due to the limitations of 
this project this has not been an option. 
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3. Analysis 
 
3.1. Huntington 
3.1.1. Introduction 
In order to understand how Samuel P. Huntington may have influenced the foreign policies expressed in 
the speeches it is important to have an in depth understanding of his theories. To fully understand the 
concept it is essential to have a clear picture of his definition of “Civilization”. Furthermore it is vital to 
understand which paradigms he uses to build his own theory on. In order to find these answers the project 
will through this chapter try to answer the following question: 
What is the theory outline of Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations”?  
The first part of this chapter will describe who Huntington was and furthermore describe his career and 
from where he may have been influenced. It then goes on to describe different paradigms, which in short 
are important concepts form which he builds his theory on. They are placed first because they provide the 
most basic knowledge and most important points in his theories. The chapter then goes on to describe and 
define the concepts of civilization and culture as Huntington describes them. To put the theories into 
perspective the chapter will end with a discussion that includes two articles that strongly disagrees with 
Huntington. In order to understand where the critique comes from the chapter will also briefly cover their 
background. 
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3.1.2 Biography of Samuel P. Huntington 
Samuel P. Huntington (18.04.1927-24.12.2004) was, among other things, a political scientist and professor 
at Harvard University, where he founded the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. After graduating from 
Harvard he began teaching Political Science at Harvard University. Since then Samuel P. Huntington has 
either himself authored or helped authoring 17 books and numerous academic articles26. Among these are 
“The Soldier and the State”, which examines the relationship between a country’s military and its citizens, 
and “The Clash of Civilizations” which is being analysed in this project. “The Soldier and the State”, which 
was his first work, came under a lot of critique from both political wings. According to his wife it may have 
been the first time he received massive critique27 but it was most defiantly not the last. Throughout the 
years Samuel P. Huntington and his theories has been the subject of many debates. According to the 
journal, Foreign Affairs, his “The Clash of Civilizations” article, led to more discussion in three years, than 
any article they had published since the 1940s28. The book “The Clash of Civilizations – and the remaking of 
world order” came out in 1996.29 
Samuel P. Huntington started his political career in 1968 as a foreign advisor for Hubert Humphrey’s, under 
his run for presidency30. Later he worked for the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter in 
the years 1977-78. His wife Nancy has said about his political opinions: “But on foreign policy, he was widely 
seen as a hawkish conservative, although one who opposed the invasion of Iraq and had little sympathy for 
the neoconservatives of the Bush administration.”31. So though having similar thoughts when it comes to 
the incapability of cooperation of civilizations he strongly disagreed with the war in Iraq.  
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3.1.3. Theory outline  
3.1.3.1. Post-Cold War paradigms:  
Huntington explains that in order to understand the international affairs of the world and its civilization one 
needs a simplified map or paradigm, which are “indispensable for human thought and action”32. He then 
continues to outline four paradigms or maps of world politics that were created at the end of the Cold War, 
although not by himself.  
The first paradigm is “One World: Euphoria and Harmony”. This thesis, which was also formulated by 
Francis Fukuyama as the “End of History” thesis,33 basically suggested that the end of the Cold War meant 
the end of conflict in global politics and that “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government34”. However this 
paradigm proved insufficient, which was visible due to the ethnic cleansings, intensification of religious 
fundamentalism, and resurgence of neo-communist and neo-fascist movements amongst with the fact that 
the United Nations and United States were not able to stop bloody local conflicts35. 
The next paradigm is the “Two Worlds: Us and Them”. This thesis suggests that the world can be split into 
two, us and them. As mentioned people sometimes define themselves by whom they are not, which means 
a picture of us and them is often painted. However it is not quite clear how to split the world. Huntington 
mentions that one way to do it is between poor and rich, but thinking that conflict would grow from 
difference in wealth between nation states is unlikely because “the poor countries lack the political unity, 
economic power, and military capacity to challenge the rich countries36”. East and West is another possible 
way to split the world according to Huntington, but again this leaves us with a lot of holes. As an example 
Huntington asks what certain non-western societies have in common. Japanese, Chinese, Muslim and 
African civilizations do not share many things in terms of social structure, religion and values. It is clear, 
according to Huntington, that this paradigm also has its shortcomings, and cannot give us a clear picture of 
global politics and international relations in the post-Cold War world.  
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The third paradigm Huntington analyses is the “184 states, More or Less”. This thesis is obviously based on 
the nation states of the world, and it is based on those states being the most important actors in 
international politics. It claims that states will perceive their interest in similar ways, and act the same way, 
and that power is the most important thing that makes the states behave the way they do. Huntington 
suggests that although states define their interest in terms of power, it is far from the only thing they are 
interested in. Values, culture and institutions also plays a large role in how states define their interest 
according to Huntington37 and they are not only limited within a given nation state´s borders, as nation 
states will seek to cooperate and ally with other nation states that share similar values and culture. These 
nation states will not fight each other, but conflict will occur with other nation states because “states define 
threats in terms of the intentions of other states, and those intentions and how they are perceived are 
powerfully shaped by cultural considerations38” according to Huntington. This means that threats are more 
likely to be seen as coming from societies that have different cultures and values; because another nation 
state with a different society might not understand or feel they can trust a culture which they cannot relate 
as much to.  Huntington also mentions that although nation states are the primary actors in world affairs 
they are still losing power on many levels. First of all, international institutions like the European Union 
have influenced the nation states, and there are now restrictions on numerous things like free trade for 
instance, which means the nation states cannot individually decide how they want to do everything, thus 
resulting in a loss of power and sovereignty. At the same time nation states have also surrendered power to 
regional and local politics, which now has more autonomy. Huntington concludes that nation states have 
lost a large part of their ability to control money flow in and out of the country and are facing difficulties 
with controlling the flow of ideas, technology and people39. Huntington concludes that this means that the 
state borders have become permeable, and that the “184 States: More or Less” thus is not a fulfilling thesis 
on world affairs in the post-Cold War world, although it is fairly close to reality. 
The weakening of the nation states leads us to the last paradigm, which Huntington discusses: “Sheer 
Chaos”. This paradigm presents a world where governments are losing authority, there is an intensification 
of ethnic and religious conflicts, there is an emergence of international crime mafias, there are tens of 
millions of refugees, terrorism is spreading, and there are massacres and ethnic cleansing amongst other 
things. Like the “184 States More or Less” paradigm it is fairly close to reality according to Huntington40. It 
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presents an accurate picture of what is going on in the world, but on the other hand it fails to acknowledge 
that there is still plenty of order in today’s world.  
Huntington concludes that all these paradigms are right in certain ways and wrong in others. They are 
incompatible because the world cannot be both one and divided in two between for instance East and 
West. “The world is either one, or two, or 184 states, or potentially an almost infinite number of tribes, 
ethnic groups, and nationalities41”. This leads to Huntington presenting his thesis, that it is easiest to view 
the world in terms of seven or eight civilizations. It builds on the other paradigms and is more compatible 
with them, than they are with each other according to Huntington.  Huntington mentions that the 
civilizational viewing of the world holds that the world can be viewed as split into two: the West and the 
rest (non-Western many). The rest however have little in common and thus must be split into more groups.  
It also holds that nation states are still the most important actors in the world, but that their interests and 
conflicts are mostly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors. Lastly it acknowledges that the world is 
anarchical, with national and tribal conflicts, but the most dangerous conflicts are those between actors 
from different civilizations.  
According to Huntington, his civilizational paradigm thus gives us a relatively simple, but not too simple 
map for understanding the world in the post-Cold War world in the end (and the start) of the 20th century42. 
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3.1.3.2. Definition of Culture, Civilization and Civilizations:  
In order to properly understand what affect Huntington and his theories have had on the general 
understanding of civilizations and more specifically on American foreign affairs it is necessary to identify 
and define the concept of civilization. The following paragraphs will describe the definition of the concept 
used in the report and furthermore look into how it has become influential on the political stage. 
According to Huntington it is important to distinguish between civilization in the singular and civilizations in 
the plural43. French thinkers developed civilization as a term in the 18th century to describe the opposite of 
barbarism, meaning that a civilized society was one that was not primitive, and that it was literate, and 
settled. Being civilized was good and being uncivilized was bad44. During the 19th century Europeans started 
to use the concept of civilization as a measuring stick for judging whether or not non-European societies 
were civilized enough to be a part of the European-dominated international system.45 People46 did however 
start to talk about civilizations in the plural. They rejected the idea of civilization being the only ideal, and 
that there was a standard for what was civilized. Instead they claimed that there were numerous 
civilizations that all were civilized in their own way. Huntington’s view on civilizations in the plural is not 
that “other” civilizations are barbaric; quite on the contrary he believes that civilizations have evolved in 
totally different directions, which will lead to conflicts. 
“Civilizations are the biggest “we” within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all other 
“thems” out there.”47  Even though he emphasises civilizations in plural, the singular form is also very 
important as he expresses that it is often the West versus the rest. The rest being other civilizations that do 
not share the same culture and ideas as the West. Indirectly he sets it up as the civilization in singular, 
meaning that it becomes a case of us and the others. He states that even though the youth of other 
civilizations might drink Coca Cola and wear jeans they still belong to another civilization. He puts up a very 
harsh line that really emphasizes that the west is nothing like the Muslim world for instance. It is therefore 
important to note that Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations” includes the fact that they might clash. This is 
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a tendency that might have spread to some parts of the political stage in the United States, and this is one 
of the things that this project is looking into in the discourse analysis of the three speeches.   
Huntington describes culture as a force that is both divisive and unifying48. He uses the former two 
Germanys as an example of people that were divided by ideology but came together because of culture, 
and then uses the Soviet Union as an example of a society that was united by ideology but divided by 
culture, and thus fell apart. According to Huntington, the European Union and other organizations that are 
based on nation states with similar culture are also more successful than those who try to transcend 
culture. 49 
“Civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is culture writ 
large.”50 By this Samuel P. Huntington means that civilization is a deeply emotionally rooted thing. He 
describes that civilization is an extension of culture. Within culture many different things including values, 
ethnicity, language and religion is emphasized.  He argues that this kind of civilization is not restricted by 
national or political borders, but can spread over larger areas, i.e. the western culture share the same 
religion, political mind-set and to some extent the same language and spreads over a larger area. Though 
cities or regions within a civilization are culturally unique they often share a mind-set that is very similar in 
the entire civilization. 
But seeing that civilizations are formed by the cultural identity of a group of people it does not have any 
clear beginning or end. Where it is often easy to see the beginning and the end of a political country or 
political civilization, but it becomes harder with Huntington’s cultural civilizations. He states that they are 
very long lived and that they adapt and change over the course of history. They evolve in different 
directions, both in regards to preferred political systems but also when it comes to way of life. “While 
civilizations endure, they also evolve. They are dynamics; they rise and fall; they merge and divide; (…) they 
also disappear and are buried in the sand of time.”51 
Though civilization is defined by both the everyday way of life, ethnicity and language, Samuel P. 
Huntington clearly underlines the importance of religion. He uses the ancient Greeks as an example to 
show how old archenemies like the Athenians and the Spartans could unite against the Persians because of 
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similarities in especially religion. “Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most 
important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized.”52 He argues that behind some of the major 
conflicts in the world one or more of the big religions in the world can be found. As an example he 
mentions the break-up of Yugoslavia where people share both ethnicity and language.  
Huntington mentions that the distinction between people is no longer economic, religious or political, but 
cultural. People are trying to answer, who are we?  Often the easiest way to answer this question is simply 
by asking: Who are we not? This is one of the cornerstones in the belief that civilizations cannot be unified. 
People tend to focus on the differences in order to explain who they themselves are. 
 
3.1.4. Discussion 
3.1.4.1. Dissident Voice 
The Dissident Voice claims to be an internet newsletter that fights for justice and equality.53 Consisting of a 
group of freelance journalists and intellectuals the articles are intended to first of all provoke its readers, 
but also to make them think about how the society they live in are constructed. Sunil K. Sharma who is 
based in Santa Rosa, California founded the Dissident Voice, but their staff includes many nationalities, for 
example the Norwegian editor Kim Peterson.  
3.1.4.2. Discussion by Maryam Sakeenah 
In 2009 Maryam Sakeenah, a writer for dissidentvoice.org, wrote an article that strongly disagrees with the 
view on civilization that Samuel P. Huntington describes. “With the current state of things as they stand, we 
may be moving towards the clash that Huntington predicted, but the understanding that such a clash is not 
inevitable, and that it does not have to be so, is extremely important.”54 By this she argues that one of the 
things that cause the clash of civilizations is actually the idea itself. Her concern is that Huntington’s 
concept becomes a universally accepted truth that affects politicians in not only the Western world, but 
also - but not limited to - the Islamic civilization. She believes that the clash of civilizations can and must be 
avoided through cooperation, understanding and dialogue. This dialogue must be with the entire Islamic 
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community and not just the moderate Muslims that the Christian western world has a tendency of 
choosing for communications. The moderate Muslims only make up a fraction of the entire Muslim 
population and are therefore unable to speak on the behalf of the general public. But the responsibility for 
dialogue lies on both the shoulders of the western world but also the Islamic civilization. Maryam Sakeenah 
says that it is intellectuals and religious experts on both sides that need to seek reconciliation and dialogue. 
“Intellectuals, writers, scholars, academics, the media and political leadership have a very important duty to 
highlight the grounds for cooperation between cultures and civilizations.”55  The most important change to 
be made in order to avoid the clash of civilizations is not to open but to change the dialogue, and the 
responsibility to do so lies with the above-mentioned actors. They are to change the opinion of “the others” 
in the West. It must be changed from something hostile to something one can cooperate with. She argues 
that the West still works with the mentality of the Cold War where an enemy is created. In the post-Cold 
War world the Islamic civilization is demonized.  
“Religion (…) has the potential both for peacemaking and conflict resolution as well as conflict and 
violence.”56 Very much like Huntington Maryam Sakeenah underlines the importance of religion in world 
affairs. But where Huntington sees the major world religions as entities that cannot cooperate she 
emphasises the importance of interpretation. She argues that it is only some parts of Muslim society that 
interprets violence and hatred towards the Western world. Furthermore she argues that some of these 
aggressive interpretations are formed by previous incidents and conflicts with the West. One of the main 
points is that it is some key persons, and not the religion itself that argues for violence. “At the end of the 
day, it will come down to interpretation, selection and the hermeneutic direction of religious communities. 
That, in turn is deeply tied up with questions of the economic and psychological health of their members, 
the wounds of history and the decisions of key leaders to direct their communities’ deepest beliefs, practices 
and doctrines toward healing and reconciliation or towards hatred and violence.”57  Here she states that 
helping the religious communities through both economic ties and dialogue the western world is able to 
change the attitude of the communities. 
In the final paragraphs of the article she concludes that the clash of civilizations between the Western and 
the Islamic civilization are historically false. She argues that civilizations can cooperate and uses Spain 
where Muslims, Jews and Christians lived together, as an example. 
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She then asks how the clash between Western and Islamic civilizations emerges. “It emerges as a corollary 
to interventionist, adventurist, exploitative policies vis a vis the Muslim world by the ascendant West 
steeped in the compulsions of its espoused Materialism and Capitalism.”58 By this she argues that the clash 
of civilizations appears, not because it is inevitable but only when civilizations and nations act aggressively 
and without concern for anything else. 
 
3.1.4.3. Discussion by Shirazi 
While Huntington mentions the former two Germany’s as a group of people that were divided by ideology 
but later united by culture Shirazi uses examples of people that were united by culture but yet experienced 
serious conflicts. Shirazi uses North Korea and South Korea, China and Taiwan and the Hutu and Tutsis of 
Rwanda, as examples of conflicts between groups that Huntington would claim are from the same 
civilizations that he presents in “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”59. Shirazi 
claims, that it is often easier for people from different civilizations to get along, because they suspend their 
standards of judgement. 
Huntington’s theory on “The Clash of Civilizations” is not a universally accepted theory. Many people are 
critical towards it and disagree with it. One of the many critique points is that the origins of wars are usually 
not solely related to civilizational- or cultural differences. Many other aspects play a role in the complex 
process of a war. Things like money, resources, politics, safety of citizens and military capacity are all things 
that a nation state, or a union of these, has to consider before declaring war. Another thing is the fact that 
certain different civilizations do not seem to be in conflict as much as other. 
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3.1.5. Critique of Huntington 
Some of the main faults in Huntington’s theories and description of civilizations are the lack of data and the 
assumptions. One of the points for instance comes when he lists the civilizations and seems unable to 
decide on whether seven or eight civilizations exist60.  He is unable to clearly define whether or not Africa is 
an independent civilization or simply a part of others. When it comes to assumptions he also seems to be 
undergoing a lot of critique. He for instance throws the Koreas, China, Taiwan and other Asian countries 
into one civilization, the Sinic. This does not fit with his claim that conflicts mostly happen between 
civilizations and not within them. North and South Korea are supposedly in the same civilization yet there 
has for many years been a conflict between the two and it is still on-going. Other examples include Russia, 
being a part of the Orthodox Civilization, becoming a member of NATO, an organisation belonging to the 
Western Civilization. Finally he provides confusing arguments on the South American civilization. On one 
hand it is a culturally different civilization not linked to the Western, but on the other hand it is both, 
politically, economically and on a religious basis closely interlinked with the Western civilization. After 
dashing back and forth a few times he concludes that it is in fact independent from the West. 
Huntington also seems to be generalizing a lot in terms of his division of civilizations. Is it really possible to 
put a large group of people into one specific civilization? There are plenty of multicultural societies in the 
world, the United States being one example, where the inhabitants do not necessarily share the same 
culture or religion. Can they then be perceived as being part of the same civilization? And if they have 
different cultural backgrounds, should they not be clashing within that civilization? Even though Huntington 
argues that you need a “simplified” map of the world, his map might be too superficial and generalizing.  
 
3.1.6. Summary and conclusion 
3.1.6.1. Summary 
The chapter starts by describing Samuel P. Huntington’s political career as both a member of the National 
Security Council and a foreign advisor for Huber Humphrey in his run for President. It also covers his 
academic work both in the written but also his work as a lecturer at Harvard. The next part describes the 
four important thesis: “One World: Euphoria and Harmony”, “Two worlds: Us and Them”, “184 States: 
more or less” and the “Sheer Chaos” paradigms. The chapter then continues by describing Huntington’s 
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definition of culture, civilization and the link between the two. Then an article by Maryam Sakeenah and 
the article “Your New Enemies by Said Shirazi is described and used to discuss the flaws of Huntington’s 
theories. Both writers wrote for the Dissident Voice, which is an Internet newsletter and is more thoroughly 
described in the last paragraphs of the chapter. 
3.1.6.2. Conclusion 
In conclusion Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations”is very relevant when it comes to American foreign 
policies. Though they are not clearly related to a political subsystem or a President, they can be used in the 
analyses of the chosen speeches, and investigate whether the Presidents has been influenced by the 
concept. Since all of the three speeches are related to conflict between the United States and Iraq, they 
might actually have been held in the midst of a possible clash between civilizations, which Huntington 
describes.  
The concept is well known and has also been debated heavily. Maryam Sakeenah, for instance, feared that 
Huntington’s concept would be universally accepted and that people would forget that these clashes are 
not inevitable. This will further help us in the discourse analysis of the three speeches by the President. By 
using the views of Maryam Sakeenah and others it will be possible to get a broader perspective of the 
concpet. 
Said Shirazi also critiques Huntington, claiming that his concept is far from the truth, because clashes are 
taking place within civilizations as well. However, Huntington acknowledges this as well, but claims that 
these conflicts will not be as dangerous as the ones between civilizations.  
Huntington’s concept is not universally accepted, and it is not a bulletproof theory. It lacks empirical data 
and facts, and has shortcomings like acknowledging that people from different cultural backgrounds 
actually live together in many places all over the world. However, its ideas cannot be ignored, as there have 
been numerous armed conflicts between the United States, and nation-states from the Islamic civilization, 
and it is therefore interesting to research whether Huntington’s ideas about civilizational clashes, can be 
found in the speeches in form of expressions of culture of values, which Huntington mentions are essential 
building blocks in his civilizations.  
 
 
 
 Value-based American Foreign Policy 
21-12-2011 29 
3.2. Discourse analysis 
3.2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the research question: Do the three Presidents express a discourse that can be 
related Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations”?  
It will be examined whether or not the Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. 
Bush have been influenced by Huntington’s concept of “Civilization”. In order to achieve this, a discourse 
analysis of the three speeches previously mentioned with focus on the “Civilization” concept developed by 
Huntington, will be made. The discourse analysis is important because it will enable a deeper investigation 
of the viewpoints in the speeches related to Huntington’s concept of “Civilization”. This analysis will 
furthermore be used in chapter three to investigate whether these viewpoints can be linked to Advocacy 
Coalition Framework. The use of discourse will help to answer the problem definition since it will show how 
the presidents perceive the concept of “Civilization”.  
 
3.2.2. Preface 
One of the most fundamental rules in doing discourse analysis is rereading the text a number of times in 
order to make specific interpretations.61  
The way of investigating the problem definition would be by investigating if the words are part of a positive 
or a negative sentence. We also need to consider the text “between the lines”, meaning to be aware of 
what haven’t been said. 
One of the most important steps to approach a discourse analysis is to read the text and extract the 
essential phrases and divide them into categories that fit the civilization terminology. The two categories 
civilization singular and civilizations plural has been chosen because these as essential in the civilization 
discussion since they represent two different views on civilization. These terms are going to be used to 
investigate whether the Presidents think of the world as one civilization or as different civilizations that 
works together. By doing this it is possible to examine which one of the two categories is more influential. 
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The focus of the discourse analysis will be on civilization as defined by Samuel P. Huntington.  The speeches 
that have been chosen were given by the three Presidents; George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and 
George W. Bush. The goal is to investigate if the term civilization is defined differently by the Presidents.  
The phrases found will be analyzed using Foucault’s view on discourses, which he defines as “tactical 
elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations”62 . So when the phrases have been detected 
they will be related either to civilization or civilizations and analyzed. Using these exact phrases it will be 
able to see whether or not they relate to Huntington’s civilization concept and thereby give an idea of how 
Huntington’s concept of civilization has influenced the presidents. 
 
 
3.2.3. George H. W. Bush 
“Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (September 11, 1990)” 
George H. W. Bush 
 
3.2.3.1. Historical Context 
During the Iran/Iraq war from 1988 till 1989, Iraq was supported by the US, but when the Iraqi leader 
Saddam Hussein declared war on Kuwait and invaded the country on the 2nd of August 1990, Iraq stood 
alone in the invasion of Kuwait. The official explanation for the invasion was an old disagreement over oil 
quotas and prices, but this explanation was an asserted symbolic one, and the real reason was said to be an 
annexing of Kuwait’s massive oil reserves.63 
The Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait during the autumn of 1990. Meanwhile the international 
community condemned the invasion and occupation. Even Arab countries like Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Egypt 
was condemning the action taken by Saddam Hussein. In the UN, the Security Council passed several 
resolutions condemning Iraqi action, and finally giving the consent to use power of force to free Kuwait. On 
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the 16th of January 1991 a broad coalition supported by the UN, and under US command went into Kuwait 
and defeated the Iraqi army in less than a month.64 
The speech “Address before a Joint Session of Congress” takes place in the midst of the international 
debate of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  
  
3.2.3.2 Analysis 
One of the discourses where H. W. Bush promotes the concept of “Civilizations” can be found in this 
sentence “no longer can a dictator [Saddam Hussein] count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted 
United Nations action against aggression”65. Here H. W. Bush clearly makes a reference to the decline of 
the Cold War and which unifies the whole world into one great civilization, which relates to the “One 
world66” paradigm. This paradigm suggests a united international community and end to conflicts in the 
world. There is also emphasize on a discourse towards the ‘dictators’, so it is the world against the 
‘dictators’ and hereby making the civilizations’ differences stand out.  
There is another part in this speech that emphasizes this discourse: “America and the world must defend 
common vital interests—and we will. America and the world must support the rule of law—and we will. 
America and the world must stand up to aggression—and we will”67. H. W. Bush also emphasizes the 
discourse of a joint world that stand together. But more significantly he separates America and the world 
by mentioning them separately. By this he means that America should lead the rest of the world in this 
common purpose. 
This discourse can be explained with the sentence “There is no substitute for American leadership”68 where 
H. W. Bush presents a discourse related to the “Civilizations” idea, since this means, that America wants to 
be the leader of the new world. But more importantly America will not give up superiority to someone else. 
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Huntington clearly states that different civilizations cannot give up sovereignty, but only clash and thereby 
eliminate the other civilization.  
The “Civilization” discourse is emphasized in a number of phrases which relates to American responsibility; 
“American citizens abroad must be protected”69 where he emphasizes that, American citizens should be 
protected. Furthermore the sentence “Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and 
reinforcing”70 builds on this discourse of America being the best candidate to rule the new united world. 
And the sentence “A lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf”71 even 
gives the impression that it is America alone that will help in the Gulf. A sentence like “Our broader 
responsibilities to deal with the continuing risks of outlaw action and regional conflict”72 also emphasizes 
this discourse. 
There are also a lot of other places in this speech where H.W. Bush is emphasizing an America that 
cooperates. An example of this is “Interdependence has increased. The consequences of regional instability 
can be global.”73 Here H.W. Bush acknowledges the increasing importance of globalization and a more 
unified world. This is yet again an acknowledgment of the growing importance of globalization where Bush 
implies that America is very much interdependent to the regional stability of other parts of the world. This 
stand contradicts with Huntington’s concept of “Civilizatons”, which states that civilizations cannot 
cooperate – much less be interdependent on each other.  
 
H. W. Bush also uses the phrase “what [Americans] must do together to defend civilized values “74Here H. W. 
Bush presents America as the peacekeeper of the world and promotes civilized values, which plays heavily 
on the concept of “Civilizations” with an “us vs. them” approach because a fundamental part of the “us vs. 
them” approach is stressing a civilized self over the less civilized others. In examining the phrase used “Iraq 
against the world”75 which creates split civilizations image between Iraq and the rest of world.  
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With the use of words and phrases such as “cooperation”76 and “A new partnership of nations has begun”77 
it is clear that H. W. Bush does not move away from his previous established discourse which is an America 
that is superior. He desires for a united world not divided by cultural divisions as long as American interests 
are kept. In short this means that regional peace and stability will only have American support if it in any 
way compliments American interests. This is furthermore underlined by the use of the phrases “The nations 
of the world”78 and “Our joint statement”79.  
 
 
3.2.3.3. Conclusion 
H. W. Bush has certain elements of Huntington’s concept, and does refer to it with a sentence like “Iraq 
against the world”80, although his “Civilizations” discourse is also used in relation to other parts of the 
world. Besides this he has a strong feeling of a joint world and cooperation, as long as it is helpful towards 
American interests. The combination of H. W. Bush’s view of America’s superiority and desire to cooperate 
creates a discourse where H. W. Bush wants America to be the leader of the post-Cold War world, which can 
be seen in relation to the “One world” paradigm that Huntington mentions.  
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3.2.4. William J. Clinton 
“Transcript President Clinton explains Iraq strike. (December 16, 1998)” 
William Jefferson Clinton 
 
3.2.4.1. Historical Context 
After the Gulf War in 1991 Iraq faced both economic and military sanctions by the UN and the rest of the 
international community. Following the sanctions and the “Oil for Food” program, UN weapon inspectors 
(UNSCOM) made regularly visits to see if Iraq had held the promise to destruct chemical weapons and 
overlook the destruction. But Iraq had long been withholding information regarding weapon programs, not 
allowing the UNSCOM to do their job.  The consequence came in November 1998 were the UNSCOM left 
the country. 
The US reacted alongside with Great Britain by starting Operation Desert Fox the 16th of December 1998. 
The operation was a four day long bombing of sites with alleged stocks of chemical weapons that had not 
been destroyed by UNSCOM. Furthermore some of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein´s palaces were also 
bombed because they alleged held labs to develop chemical and biological weapons.  
The bombing officially ended four days later in respect for the Ramadan. Operation Desert Fox had only 
scattered supporters in the UN, and in both Europe and the Middle East the strike was criticized. The 
outcome was that UNSCOM was definitive out of Iraq, which was claimed as a victory by the Iraq leader 
Saddam Hussein. 81     
The speech was transmitted live to the Americans the 16th of December at 6 p.m. 
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3.2.4.2. Analysis 
In this speech Clinton has a strong focus on the “international community”82, which he also mentions in his 
speech. This does not support a “civilizations (plural)” strategy but quite the opposite due to the fact that 
Clinton’s strategy strengthens the idea of a world where people work together. To support his more 
international discourse he has a frequent use of the word UNSCOM, which is an abbreviation of the United 
Nations weapons inspector. Clinton mentions the name UNSCOM 11 times in his speech and by mentioning 
the organization so many times he emphasizes its importance. This is important because UNSCOM is an 
international organization and by frequently mentioning it he builds on a discourse of a world that is not 
based on a plural understanding of the concept of “Civilization”.  
He further builds on this discourse when he says that he is concerned about “the safety of people 
everywhere” 83, hereby showing concern towards everybody in the world. But contrary to the previous 
example there are other places in his speech where Clinton does make a “Civilizations” discourse. He does 
this by saying “he [Saddam Hussein] threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of the region the 
security of the world”84, which conflicts with his previous discourse of a joint world, and shows who the 
enemy is. So it is “us vs. Hussein”.  And this notion that it is only Hussein that is the problem is showing 
when Clinton says “Action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim world”85 in the 
context of attacking during Ramadan. This creates a discourse that he is taking other parts of the world into 
consideration even though this also could be an excuse for attacking at the time he did instead of waiting. 
So when he mentions Ramadan he show sympathies for other cultures but he also explains why he 
attacked when he did.   
Another thing that is important to remember is that Clinton also speaks of America as important, but he 
does not say that America is sovereign. He uses phrases like “America’s vital interest”86 and “America has 
often made a difference between chaos and community, fear and hope.”87, where he emphasizes the 
importance of American interest and American values, but nowhere in his speech does he declare these 
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things to be superior. This way Clinton makes a discourse of America having important values and being 
important, but not being superior to others. This conflicts with Huntington’s statement, that claims that a 
civilization will acknowledge its own values and norms as the right, while other values and norms are being 
looked badly upon.   
Clinton also uses this discourse of America’s importance to further emphasize the discourse towards Iraq by 
saying “If we [America] turn our backs on his defiance the credibility of U.S power as a check against 
Saddam will be destroyed.”88.  
So by looking at the discourses Clinton uses in his speech, it is visible that he reaches for an international 
cooperation that does not relate to Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations” which emphasizes conflicts 
between the various civilizations. But on the other hand he does make a discourse of “civilizations” towards 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, thereby singling them out and making them the enemy. His view on America in 
this united world is that America is important but it does not need to be superior. 
3.2.4.3. Conclusion 
The entire speech gives a clear overview about Iraqi strategy facts. After profound analysis it also shows 
that a small section of Clinton’s view and perception towards the world’s structure and Americas’ position 
in this structure. In conclusion this project would go towards the statement that President Clinton´s policy 
is not influenced by Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations”.  
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3.2.5. George W. Bush 
“President Bush announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq have ended.” 
George W. Bush 
3.2.5.1 Historical Context 
In 2002 the USA and Great Britain insisted upon the disarmament of Iraq, and if the UN did not react on this 
the two countries would take military action on their own. This led to the passing of resolution 1441 about 
arms control in Iraq. After the resolution was passed, Iraq permitted the UN weapons inspectors entry to 
the country for the first time since 1998.89 
The USA and Great Britain found that Iraq did not cooperated with the UN weapons inspectors, and wanted 
the UN to take further action towards military action against Iraq. In the Security Council France, Russia and 
China wanted to take action of non-military character, but the USA was determined that such action would 
not work on Iraq. Previous sanctions throughout the 1990s had not led to a more manageable Iraq; quite 
on the contrary, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had led a propaganda war on the USA, making the country 
responsible for the UN sanctions. The USA was sure that Iraq was having a Weapons of Mass Destruction 
programme, and the events on September 11th 2001 proved to President W. Bush that a threat needed to 
be met before an event not after. 90 
President W. Bush gave a speech on the military academy West Point where he re-launched the idea of pre-
emptive strikes. This became the so called “Bush Doctrine”, and gave green light to the non-UN supported 
invasion of Iraq the 20th of March 2003. The operation was named Operation Iraqi Freedom and had only a 
limited coalition behind it. The combat action ended for the USA on the 1st of May where President Bush 
gave “Mission Completed” speech on-board of the USS Abraham Lincoln. 91   
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3.2.5.2 Analysis 
In this speech Bush sympathises with the concept of “Civilization” as Huntington describes it. It can be seen 
several places. One of these places is when he says “Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and 
seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world-and will be 
confronted”92. This creates a discourse where he puts these people that are a threat to America against, as 
W. Bush calls it, the civilized world. This phrase expresses that the people of any outlaw, who poses a 
threat towards the civilized world, is less civilized. And this relates to Huntington’s concept of “Civilization”, 
because it is based on the civilized versus the less civilized. W. Bush uses this discourse other places in his 
speech like when he says “America and the civilized world”93.  
Furthermore in this speech W. Bush also creates a discourse of America being superior. He does this by 
saying: “American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty”94 
and “…anyone in the world, including the Arab world, who works and sacrifices for freedom has a loyal 
friend in the United States of America”95. So by mentioning freedom and liberty he expresses the values as 
American. This way W. Bush creates a discourse where America is superior because of these values and if 
the rest of the world chooses to adopt these values they are eligible to cooperate with America.  
W. Bush creates a discourse where American values are defining as an ideal set of values. In relation to the 
rest of the world, other countries and civilization have to adopt American values if they wants allied with 
America. Furthermore W. Bush singles out the Arab world which is comparable with Huntington´s Islamic 
civilization. This suggests that the Arab world may be different from the rest of the world.   
This discourse of “Civilization” and adopting American values is further emphasized by the phrase “Every 
culture needs liberty like they need food and water”96, where W. Bush takes a value, in this case liberty, and 
states that it is as vital as food and water. So he tries to convince the less civilized countries in the world to 
adopt these values and thereby being a supporter of America. 
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Additionally it is important to notice the amount of times W. Bush uses words that refers to a feeling of an 
“us vs. them” approach as seen in relation to Huntington’s concept of “Civilization”. As an example the 
word “our” have been used approximately 33 times, and the word “we” have been used approximately 37 
times. Since W. Bush is holding the speech on a military aircraft carrier, for a crowd that presumably are 
mostly people from the military, the frequent use of these are used to engage the military, through a 
feeling of community. Because of this there is a lot of focus on America, and America as being a 
community. Huntington states that a civilization often can be defined by what it is not. W. Bush has thus 
turned this statement around and defines them as opposed to what they are not. 
But this also further relates to the “Civilization” discourse already established, because he emphasizes this 
American community so much that he alienates, the rest of the world, but also tries to make it a 
community that other civilizations wants to be a part of. 
 
3.2.5.3. Conclusion 
In this speech W. Bush makes a clear discourse with the emphasis on “Civilization” which is the civilized 
America versus the less civilized world.  
W. Bush also emphasizes that by adopting the American values, freedom and liberty, anyone can become a 
loyal friend of America. This can be interpreted as W. Bush envisioning a world that is similar to the One 
World Paradigm, mentioned by Huntington, where all civilizations coexist. However W. Bush wants his 
envisioned united world to be based on American values.  
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3.3.6. Comparison   
3.3.6.1. Lars Erslev Andersen 
As mentioned in the method chapter, about Lars E. Andersen there are three basic civilization strategies 
and Andersen writes that each one of the Presidents fit into their own strategy. 
The relation to Huntington’s civilization strategy exerted from the analysis for H. W. Bush fits with the 
civilizations-indifferent strategy97, one of Andersen’s civilization strategies. This is because H. W. Bush does 
not see culture as an important thing, but on the contrary he sees cooperation as an advantage as long as it 
promotes the interests of America.  
According to Andersen Clinton is the only one whose strategy is not based on values which contains an 
understanding of America as the most important. Andersen claims that Clinton belongs to the civilization-
promotional strategy98 which is based on the importance of international cooperation and dialogue. This 
strategy fits the Clinton speech, but Clinton does emphasize American values although he does not see 
these values as superior. He still emphasizes them and this is in conflict with the civilization-promotional 
strategy.  
 Andersen states that W. Bush uses the civilizational-conservative strategy99 and this fits with the analysis of 
W. Bush. This is because it is a very value based strategy which states that no civilizations can work 
together or coexists. It fits in the way that it looks as if Bush tries to persuade other nations to join the 
western civilization.  
The fact that the strategies Andersen has constructed fits so well with the Presidential speeches, gives a 
better overview of how they think in regards to foreign affairs. It should be noted though that the speeches 
does not show the full extent of opinions of the individual President. An opinion expressed in a speech may 
only be that of the time in which the speech is written.  
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3.3.6.2. Samuel P. Huntington  
H.W. Bush’s strategies in foreign politics do not correlate completely with the theories of Huntington, but 
does have similarities. Where Huntington completely denies that any cooperation between civilizations is 
possible, H.W. Bush opens up for the idea of cooperation as long as it supports American interests. “What 
we must do together to defend civilized values around the world and maintain our own economic strength 
at home.”100 Here he underlines the importance of the need to work together with foreign nations to 
secure America’s own national interests. It becomes clear that he is using the international collaboration to 
ensure oil and money. “Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the World’s proven oil reserves. Iraq plus 
Kuwait controls twice that.”101 He goes on to describe that if Iraq was allowed to be in control of so much 
oil they would use their newly found power to dominate the region. This does not match with Huntington’s 
understanding that nations from within the same civilization cooperates. 
He begins a paragraph with the statement: “Recent Events have surely proven that there is no substitute for 
American leadership.”102 In the paragraph he explains how the world cooperates to prevent the Iraqi 
invasion, but the first sentence implies that America must take control. He is not very willing to give up 
neither sovereignty nor power to any other country. He is willing to cooperate with nations from other 
civilizations but only on his own terms. In this he only partly complies with Huntington’s concept in the way 
that he can cooperate with them, but will never be a part of another civilization.  
Like H. W. Bush William J. Clinton had the aspect of cooperation as a major difference between him and 
Huntington. But the main difference between the two and the point that separates Clinton from 
Huntington is the fact that Clinton focuses very much on an international cooperation with the UN as a 
central factor and power. He focuses on the fact that it is the UN and not America that took military actions 
towards Iraq. “The UN Security Council voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam´s actions and to demand that 
he immediately come into compliance.”103  
Where H.W. Bush focuses on the interest of the American people, Clinton also has some focus on both 
some minorities in Iraq but also the Middle East as a region. “And not only against a foreign enemy, but 
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even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq.”104 This contradicts Huntington’s 
concept of “Civilizations” in two ways. First of all Clinton, being a member of the Western world, seeks to 
help different Muslim groupings. Secondly he points out that Saddam is attacking other Muslims, both 
countries but also social groupings. Clinton also differs from H.W. Bush in the way that he uses regional 
safety as an argument rather than using that of the American interests. 
“Any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an 
enemy of this country, and a target of American justice.”105 With this and other statements in the speech 
George W. Bush follows a line of thought that is compatible with that of Huntington’s concept. Unlike H.W. 
Bush and very unlike Clinton the speech very much emphasizes that cooperation between civilizations is 
completely impossible. In the above statement he makes it clear that no matter who or where you are it is 
“American Justice” that will prevail. 
“The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but is worth every effort. Our coalition will 
stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq”106. This correlate to the 
part of Huntington’s concept, where two civilizations will fight each other until one of them is outlasted. W. 
Bush describes how American and other troops will stay in Iraq until democracy and stability is present. He 
makes it clear that the objective of the American military presence in the country is to make sure that 
freedom of speech and religion is present. He fights to secure American and Western values in the country. 
One might also argue that he fights for American economic interests, but the discourse analysis of the 
project has found that these points are not as present as in the speech of George W. Bush. There is a major 
difference in the speech of W. Bush and in the speech of Clinton. Though Clinton argues for a missile strike 
he focuses far more on diplomacy and the UN. W. Bush mentions a coalition, but emphasizes the 
importance of American military force, and he does nowhere in the speech mention the UN. 
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3.2.7. Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter starts by presenting how a discourse analysis is used in this particular project. It emphasizes 
that in the analysis the focal point will be on Huntington’s definition of civilization in plural and in singular. 
The chapter then proceeds by analysing the three speeches in chronological order. This means that George 
H. W. Bush is analysed first, then it proceeds to William J. Clinton and finishes with George W. Bush. Before 
the individual speech there are small paragraphs that explain in which historical context the speech is held. 
Furthermore there are small conclusions at the end of each speech in which it is briefly explained which 
civilization-strategy the speech belongs to.  
Conclusion: 
The purpose of the discourse analysis was to examine in what way the three Presidents agreed or disagreed 
with Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”. H. W. Bush fits with Huntington’s concept in the way that H.W. 
Bush does not have any interest in cooperation with civilizations if it does not benefit his own interests. He 
emphasizes American sovereignty, which very much works with Huntington’s concept. 
William J. Clinton describes a world order where the international community works together under the 
leadership of the United Nations, and this does not correspond with Huntington´s concept of “Civilizations”.  
He differs from H. W. Bush in the sense that he encourages international cooperation even if it is not in the 
interest of the USA.  
George W.  Bush is the one of the three that relates the most to with Huntington’s concept of 
“Civilizations”. Several times in his speech he creates a discourse that stresses the civilized contra the less 
civilized world. This correlates with the thesis that Huntington has described as it does not in any way seek 
cooperation between civilizations. 
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3.3. Advocacy Coalition Framework 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In 1988 Paul A. Sabatier developed the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). This policy-making model tries 
to combine different approaches within policy making by taking the impact of belief systems into 
account107. The ACF was developed to examine the change in policy over time and the role of policy-
oriented learning in the US policy-making process. This project will however only focus on the aspects of 
the concepts of belief systems, political subsystems and advocacy coalitions within the framework and this 
project have chosen the research question:  
Do the belief system of the three Presidents, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, 
contain an understanding of the concept of “Civilizations” by Huntington, and was Huntington a part of a 
political subsystem influencing the three Presidents belief system? 
The function of this chapter is to investigate if the concept of “Civilization(s)” is a part of the belief system 
of the Presidents by using Sabatier´s model. This paper wants to support the discourse analysis with 
another approach in the pursuit of answering the problem definition.  
The chapter is placed last because it functions as a supporting chapter for the discourse analysis.  
Within this chapter a theory outline of the Advocacy Coalition Framework will be introduced, and the 
concepts of political subsystem, advocacy coalition and belief system will also be introduced. After the 
theory outline an analysis of the Presidents belief system, depicted in the speeches, is conducted and it is 
investigated if the concept of “Civilization(s)” is a part of the Presidents belief system. 
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3.3.2. Theory outline 
3.3.2.1 Political subsystems 
Sabatier developed the concept of “Political Subsystems” within the ACF to explain which actors are 
involved in the policy-making process. The “Political Subsystems” are defined as: “…the set of actors who 
are involved in dealing with a policy problem such as air pollution, mental health, or energy”108.  According 
to Sabatier the actors within the political subsystems in the policy-making process stand outside the 
traditionally notion of the “iron triangle”109 in the policy-making process: “…journalists, researchers, and 
others who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas, as well as 
actors at other levels of government who play important roles in policy formulation and implementation”110. 
This means that Sabatier widens the scope for actors in the policy-making process, and takes into account 
actors that are normally seen as standing outside the process.   
The emergence of political subsystems is also an aspect that Sabatier covers: “The most likely emergence of 
new subsystems is that a group of actors become dissatisfied enough with the neglect of a particular 
problem by existing subsystems to form their own”111. This could e.g. be certain environmentalist groupings 
that have been founded to fight specific problems such as the killing of baby seals in Greenland.  
The emergence of a political subsystem can also happen from an existing subsystem: “…in other cases a 
new system is essentially the product of a subset of a dominant coalition becoming large and specialized 
enough to form its own”112. 
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3.3.2.1.1. Advocacy Coalition 
The political subsystems normally contain a varied and large set of actors. This means that it becomes 
necessary to divide the actors involved in the policy-making process into “…smaller and theoretically useful 
sets of categories”113. These categories are named “advocacy coalitions”, and contain “…people from a 
variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest groups leaders, researchers) who share a 
particular belief system – i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who 
show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time”114. This means that Sabatier is regarding a 
greater circle of people influencing and taking part in the policy-making process. The number of advocacy 
coalitions within a political subsystem is normally quite small; 2-4 important coalitions115.  
An important fact to mention is that: “Not everyone active in a policy subsystem will `belong to´ an 
advocacy coalition or share one of the major belief systems. Some researchers and others may participate 
simply because they have certain skills to offer, but otherwise be indifferent to the policy disputes”116.  This 
means that academics may play an important role in the advocacy coalitions without belonging to one 
particular. The “policy broker”, an actor in the policy-making process, typically chief executives, who is 
concerned with keeping the conflict within reasonable and acceptable limits, normally stands outside the 
advocacy coalitions as well117: “While high civil servants may be brokers, they are also often policy 
advocates – particularly when their agency has a clearly defined mission” 118. 
The importance of the resources of the advocacy coalitions is highlighted by Sabatier in the ACF. He 
stresses that: “While belief systems will determine the direction in which an advocacy coalition (or any other 
political actor) will seek to move governmental programs, its ability to do so will be critically dependent 
upon its resources”119. The resources of the advocacy coalitions could be legal authority and/or expertise 
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and money. Furthermore the change of resources over time, e.g. in the recruiting of new members, is not 
to neglect120.  
 
3.3.2.2. Belief system 
Sabatier sees the belief system of the advocacy coalitions as the “glue” of politics121, which is why it 
becomes important to investigate. In the ACF Sabatier assumes that: “They (read: advocacy coalitions) will 
resist information suggesting their basic beliefs may be invalid and/or unattainable and they will use formal 
policy analyses primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs (or attack their opponents”122. But why is 
the belief system of an advocacy coalition important in the policy-making process? Because: “Coalitions 
seek to translate their beliefs into public policies (programs)”123. When investigating an advocacy coalition’s 
belief system and the structure of it, it is possible to detect the “why” in policy-making; that is why different 
actors (advocacy coalitions) act and take different stands in the policy-making process and outside of it. For 
Sabatier an important notion is also that advocacy coalitions seek power and uses their belief system in the 
process: “…a coalition seeks power to translate its core belief system into policy. It will not abandon those 
(core) beliefs merely to stay in power, although it may well abandon secondary aspects and even try to 
incorporate some of the opponent´s core as secondary aspects of the program”124. 
It is important to state that the term belief system(s) in the ACF is not to be confused with self-interest. 
Sabatier sees belief systems to be more inclusive, and therefore more accurate125. “Thus the framework 
explicitly rejects the view that actors are primarily motivated by their short-term self-interest and thus the 
``coalitions of convenience´´ of highly varying composition will dominate policy-making over time126”.  
The nature of the belief system within an advocacy coalition is according to Sabatier fragmented to a 
certain point: “It would be absurd to assume that all members of an advocacy coalition have precisely the 
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same belief system”127. Therefore he makes the following hypotheses in relation to the belief systems of 
the members of an advocacy coalition: “Hypothesis 2: Actors within an advocacy coalition will show 
substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects. 
Hypothesis 3: An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief system before 
acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core”128.  
The structure of the belief system of an advocacy coalition is extremely significant. Sabatier divides the 
belief system into a structure of 3 aspects or parts: Deep (normative) core, near (policy) core and secondary 
aspects129: 
FIGURE 1: STRUCTURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS OF POLICY ELITES
130
 
 Deep (normative) 
core 
Near (policy) Core Secondary Aspects 
Defining 
characteristics 
Fundamental normative 
and ontological axioms 
 
Fundamental policy 
positions concerning the 
basic strategies for 
achieving normative 
axioms of deep core 
Instrumental decisions and 
information searches 
necessary to implement 
policy core 
Scope Part of basic personal 
philosophy. Applies to all 
policy areas 
Applies to policy area of 
interest (and perhaps a few 
more) 
Specific to 
policy/subsystem of 
interest 
Illustrative 
components 
E.g.: The nature of man, 
relative priority if various 
ultimate values, basic 
criteria of distribution of 
justice  
 
E.g.: Magnitude of 
perceived threat to those 
values, proper scope of 
governmental vs. market 
activity, orientation on 
substantive policy conflicts 
Most decisions concerning 
administrative rule, 
disposition of cases and 
information concerning 
program performance 
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Table 2 shows which part(s) of the belief system that is adaptable to change; that is which part of the belief 
system that the political subsystems are willing to change in the policy-making process. The “Secondary 
aspects” are the most adaptable to change; this is the “aspect” that political subsystems are barging over in 
the policy-making process. The near core part of the belief system is very difficult to change, but it can 
occur if significant anomalies are experienced. The deep core part of the aspect is impossible to change; the 
beliefs here are compared to religious beliefs: “Once something has been accepted as a core belief, 
however, powerful egodefense, peer-group, and organizational forces create considerable resistance to 
change even in the face of countervailing empirical evidence or internal inconsistencies ”131. 
FIGURE 2: BELIEF SYSTEM´S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CHANGE
132
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3.3.3. Analysis 
3.3.3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will serve as a useful tool to investigate to what extend the Presidents follow their deep 
(normative) core and the near (policy) core133 in their belief system, or if they have been forced to change 
their normative or policy core belief, and to what extent. Furthermore this analysis will shed light on the 
President’s view on Huntington in relation to their joint core belief system. 
 
3.3.3.2. George H. W. Bush 
Throughout the presidential speech “Address before a Joint Session of Congress”134 George H. W. Bush 
coheres the aggressive discourse of national interests. This emphasis on the national interest gives a clear 
idea of the President’s belief system which is dominated by the deep core believe that American national 
interests are the most important, and comes before any other values that America may also have. In 
illustrating how the deep core belief may be utilized, the invasion of Kuwait to liberate the country paints a 
clear picture. H. W. Bush felt that American interests, in the form of oil135, were threatened and thus acted. 
But he did not complete the invasion by replacing the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein with a pro-American 
leader. The deep core of H. W. Bush is this speech a strict view on the world, with America as the natural 
centre, but no more than that. The historical context of H. W. Bush’s presidency further on supports this 
core belief. During the Cold War the Middle Eastern countries with America as their protector were some 
of the most undemocratic. This shows that a value such as democracy is unimportant in foreign policy, 
while national interests are. 
H. W. Bush’s deep core belief does not acknowledge Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations” which focuses 
on the different civilizations working against each other due to cultural differences. H. W. Bush is more 
concerned with the interests of America and not values such as democracy, and thereby cooperates with 
certain Middle Eastern countries to retain this interest.  
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Along with his deep core belief(s) come the near (policy) core belief(s), in which the fundamental views 
concerning policy positions are displayed136. H. W. Bush's near core belief portraits a wish for a joint world. 
The political area here is concerned with the creation of a unipolar world with America as the leading 
power, which will serve as a promoter of American interests. 
Looking at Huntington’s theories this fits together with the approach of H. W. Bush in relation to his joint 
core belief system. In Huntington’s interpretation of the “184 states, More or Less”137 paradigm he 
emphasize that the nation state is the most important actor in international affairs but it will seek alliances 
with other nations with similar values if necessary. The liberation of Kuwait shows this exact behaviour.  
The near core belief can also be accounted for by Huntington’s interpretation of the paradigm: “The two 
worlds: Us and them”138 paradigm. As President H. W. Bush mentioned in his speech139, the decline in the 
Soviet Union's aggressive stand towards America leads to an increasing gap in the American understanding 
of ‘them’. The answer to this could either be a creation of a new ‘them’ by the means of a bipolar world 
system, or gain total leadership through hegemony. The near core belief of H. W. Bush suggests the latter.  
Both the deep core and the near core belief of H. W. Bush can be spotted in Andersen’s civilizational 
strategies140. More specifically in the civilizational-indifferent strategy141 where Andersen argues that 
President H. W. Bush’s sole interest is to secure the interests of America. As mentioned in the discourse 
analysis of this speech these interests can only be secured through a balance of power, deterrence and 
containment142. Andersen’s argument fits with the investigated deep core belief of H. W. Bush. Andersen 
explains the near core belief of President H. W. Bush with the large coalition lead by the US in the first Gulf 
War (1990-1991) and thus achieves the deep core belief through cooperation in the near core spectra.  
H. W. Bush's strict view on America's role in the world is a precise description of his entire joint core belief 
system. The lack of interest in the doing of the rest of the world and “the power, containment and 
deterrence policy” further emphasize the shape of H. W. Bush's belief system. The deep core is thus a 
predominant interest in American values and interests (national as well as international) and similar lack. 
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Just like the deep core, the near core is also concerned with American interests, but in the form of 
dominating leadership on international level.  
Even though H. W. Bush's deep core belief rejects the theories of Huntington, his near core is very much 
concerned with the paradigms that Huntington is discussing, thus indicating that H. W. Bush's near core 
may have been influenced by a political subsystem, particularly because the ideas of Huntington’s 
interpretations are present in H. W. Bush’s near core.  
 
3.3.3.3. William J. Clinton 
The Democratic President William J. Clinton represents a very different view from that of the former 
President, George H. W. Bush. Not only is Clinton's discourse radically different, but his belief system is too. 
Whereas H. W. Bush emphasized national interests143, Clinton promotes international cooperation144. This 
stand is reflected in his belief system. The many times he mentions the UN in his speech (see the discourse 
analysis for an elaboration) also indicate that his deep core belief is centred in the belief that UN should 
play an central role in the world and thus rejecting a worldwide American leadership. Clinton's order of 
nature145 (and thus the deep core belief) is a united world with the UN as highest authority.  
The core belief of Clinton contradicts certain points in Huntington's theories. For example, Huntington 
emphasizes´ that cultural differences would hinder and even prevent civilizations from cooperating146. 
However the “One world: Euphobia and Harmony”147 paradigm suggests that the end of the Cold War 
would bring an end to ideological conflicts. A thesis Clinton seems to depict in his deep core belief. 
The near (policy) core of Clinton can be traced to the rest of his belief system. The near core represents 
how the holder of the belief system wants to execute his deep core belief. Clinton's near core holds the 
belief that international policies need to be made by the international community, e.g. the UN. The near 
core reflects and supports the deep core by promoting UN resolutions as the political means of action in 
the world system. This near core can be spotted in the approval of numerous UN resolutions against Iraq. 
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But Clinton turns out not to be true to his own near core belief, which will be discussed later. It should be 
noted that Clinton uses an UN approach in both his core believes.  
Just like Clinton's deep core belief, the near core is deeply influenced by Huntington’s interpretation of the 
“One world” paradigm. Just like Huntington proposes the idea of a final form of ultimate government as 
being the Western liberal democracy, Clinton too promotes this ideological type of ultimate government, 
but in the perspective of the UN as law- and decision maker. This means that Clinton promotes action 
through UN resolutions. The ”One world” paradigm is thus greatly represented in the President's near core 
belief. 
The fact that Clinton turns on his own core belief should not be left unnoticed. As already mentioned 
Clinton changed part of his core belief system when he ordered the missile strike on Iraqi locations from 
the 16th to the 19th of December 1998. This military action does not only contradict with his near core 
belief, but also with his fundamental deep core belief. The deep-felt believe in the UN Clinton was 
promoting before the attack is again present after the missile strike. This creates a paradox were his deep 
core believes in the UN, but at the same time uses UN-unauthorized military action against Iraq. His own 
explanation for this evasion is the Iraqi limitation of UN to operate in Iraq. In conclusion Clinton contradicts 
his own core believes in order to preserve these very same beliefs.  
In relation to Huntington the turns of core beliefs is seen as the conclusive argument for rejecting the “One 
world” paradigm, and thus argue that the civilizations are too diverse to be able to live under one 
international government – the UN.  
Even though the paradigms that Huntington mentions in “The Clash of Civilizations” can be spotted 
throughout Clinton's global approach it should be noted that he and his administration on several occasions 
rejected Huntington's theories148. So what strategy could Clinton base his foreign policy on? Lars E. 
Andersen presents the theory of civilizational-promoting strategy149, which advances the idea that the 
world is one civilization with minor differences. Andersen argues that Clinton's foreign policy fits with this 
strategy's basic understanding of human rights and international coherence. That this is true can be spotted 
in the deep core of Clinton. His deep core is based on the idea of global peace and cooperation across 
different cultures.  
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In a world filled with regional conflicts and bloodshed it can be hard to imagine that the new world order150 
that H. W. Bush foretold had been realized. But Clinton's deep core belief is thus concerned with the 
promotion and maintenance of international law and order. And it’s not only America's job to maintain 
global peace, but the international community and the UN. His near core further support the deep core by 
relying on the efficiency of UN resolutions. Clinton's belief system is hard to relate to the paradigm upon 
which Huntington base his theories. His idealistic view on the world order, reject Huntington's “Clash of 
Civilizations” and his administration have dismissed Huntington and his theories a number of times.  
 
3.3.3.4. George W. Bush 
The rhetorical discourse of George W. Bush holds the same aggressive approach towards national interests 
as President H. W. Bush, but to a much greater extend. While H. W. Bush only had a deep core concerning 
American interests and to some extend ignoring the situations of the rest of the world, W. Bush’s deep core 
belief are that American values are fundamentally superior and the near core is utilized through 
preemptive strikes. W. Bush takes clear standpoints throughout the speech which further emphasizes his 
force relations (see the discourse analysis for elaboration). But his rhetorical approach can also give an 
illustration of his core belief system and which values this system holds for W. Bush. The speech suggests 
that his fundamental deep core belief concerns the national interests and values of America151. But unlike 
President H. W. Bush’s deep core, W. Bush emphasizes this belief on a greater level. His nature of the world 
order152 is expressed through the belief that American values and morals are the only right and 
fundamental truths in the world153, simply ignoring/not accepting the values of the rest of the world. The 
very core of W. Bush’s deep core is thus the idea of American values as being the basic truth, while the 
overall deep core more generally concerns the American leadership of the world due to these believes.  
According to Huntington civilizations will not be able to coexist as long as their interest in culture and 
values are directly conflicting154. Seen in this perspective W. Bush’s core belief is opposed by the Middle 
Eastern nations in many ways. First of all, the American interest in Middle Eastern oil requires a stabile 
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region (as already mentioned in the analysis H. W. Bush wished for this as well, but otherwise without 
interest in the political landscape). A stability which is threatened by the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. 
Second, the American values was absent almost throughout the Middle East. The majority of the Middle 
Eastern countries used other types of government than the western liberal democracy.  Furthermore 
Huntington expresses that there is an elimination-feeling among the rivalling civilizations, which can only 
be changed by exterminating the ‘other’. Due to the core belief this feeling is present and can be spotted in 
the aggressive discourse used by W. Bush. 
To protect and realize the deep core belief, the near core will be utilized through such actions as 
preemptive strikes. While the deep core is the fundamental opinion, the near core will be used to 
implement this opinion. W. Bush uses the preemptive strikes – the near core belief – to constitute his deep 
core. The deep core will thereby serve as an argument for taking action against possible threats, while the 
near core will act as the physical action, and thus be justified by the deep core.   
Continuing in the lines of Huntington’s emphasis on non-coexistence, the near core belief of W. Bush serves 
as an argument for the “184 states; More or less” paradigm155. Bush's near core belief acts on the different 
civilization due to the differences in the basic cultural values, and thus tries to streamline the others' values 
through military deterrence. It could also be interpreted as a violent attempt to gain the ultimate global 
Western liberal democracy as suggested in the “One world” paradigm156. This, however seems to be 
conflicting with Bush's fundamental deep core, which promote American leadership, not international (as 
suggested by Huntington in his interpretation of this paradigm). 
The deep core belief of W. Bush is well represented in Andersen’s theory about the civilizational-
conservative strategy157. Like W. Bush’s deep core belief Andersen’s states that the policymaker of this 
strategy cannot cooperate with other civilizations due to a difference in values. He furthermore describes 
this strategy as very aggressive and the only way to solve a global issue is through war158.  
The core belief of W. Bush resembles those of H. W. Bush, but with some very significant differences. First 
of all the deep core of W. Bush is concerned with the interests and values of America. But he believes the 
American values and morals to be the ultimate truth and the only values that are valid. Furthermore the 
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near core is very concerned with protecting these deep core values, and displays the political action as 
military preemptive strikes. W. Bush displays a clear and aggressive `us vs. them´ tactic in his rhetorical 
approach to these threats and the possible solution to this.  
 
3.3.4. Huntington  
3.3.4.1. Huntington´s relation with Washington D.C. 
Huntington´s first official position in Washington D.C. can be traced back to when he was a foreign policy 
advisor in the 1968-Presidential campaign for Hubert H. Humphrey159. In the Carter administration, 1977 
and 1978, he served as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council160. 
According to Huntington´s CV, published by Harvard University after his death161, he held several positions 
as service to the Government. Among these are the position as a consultant for the Policy Planning Council 
in the Department of State in 1967, as a member of the Board of Visitors for the National Defense 
University in 1980-1988, as a Member of the Advisory Board for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) in 1980-1991, and as a member of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy in 
1986-1988.162   
Due to the available information this paper cannot prove that Huntington had a direct influence on the US 
policy making process and if he officially was a part of a political subsystem or even an advocacy coalition. It 
is not clear, or provable, if Huntington shared (a) belief system with a political subsystem; it can only be 
assumed. According to Sabatier: “Not everyone active in a policy subsystem will `belong to´ an advocacy 
coalition or share one of the major belief systems. Some researchers and others may participate simply 
because they have certain skills to offer, but otherwise be indifferent to the policy disputes”163. This shows 
that Huntington, according to Sabatier´s theory, can have been a part of a political subsystem without 
actively participating.   
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3.3.5. Summary and conclusion 
3.3.5.1. Summary 
The analysis takes into account that the belief system of the three Presidents are very different and 
therefore leads them to handle foreign affairs differently. The analysis investigates the deep (normative) 
core and the near (policy) core. This is done in relation to Huntington’s concept of “Civilization”. The 
conclusion of this analysis is thus that the Presidents hold different core believes; from Clinton’s deep core 
concerning international involvement, H. W. Bush’s deep core regarding the American interests, to W. Bush 
who´s deep core promotes American values. 
3.3.5.2. Conclusion 
As stated in the introduction to the analyses it has been investigated what the different Presidents’ belief 
system is and how it has been put into practice. Furthermore a comparison to Andersen’s theories has been 
made to conclude whether the belief system of the Presidents fits with Huntington or not. William J. 
Clinton’s belief system is rooted in the deep core belief of international law and order and the emphasis on 
the role of the UN. His near core deals with the belief that this order should be maintained through the UN 
and thus conflicting with Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”, which states that international order and 
peace is unachievable. On the other hand H. W. Bush and W. Bush rejects the approach of Clinton, but to 
different extends. H. W. Bush holds a wish for a future united world, but only as long as it serves America’s 
interests.  His deep core is thus concerned with the interest of America, while his near core attempts to 
realise this vision stressing the importance of American leadership. W. Bush’s deep core belief emphasize 
on American values as being the ultimate right ones. The near core is thus used to protect the deep core 
and the way to do this is through military action. 
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4. Conclusion 
How does Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”, ultimately based on values, relate to the belief systems 
and discourse formed by the three Presidents expressed in the speeches by George H.W. Bush, William J. 
Clinton and George W. Bush? 
It has been taken into consideration that a majority of information regarding policymaking in America is not 
available for research and the project has therefore been based solely on the three speeches. Furthermore 
it should be said that the speeches works as a case study and therefore does not express the full content of 
the opinions of the Presidents. 
Huntington’s defines his concept of “Civilizations” as cultural clashes between social groupings combined in 
civilizations across nation state borders. This concept of “Civilizations” is discussed by Said Shirazi and 
Maryam Sakeenah. One of the main points of the critique is that the concept lacks empirical data. The 
concept cannot be completely ignored though seeing that there have been several clashes between the 
Western and the Islamic civilizations.  
Though Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations” relates to all three speeches they all relate to it differently. 
George H.W. Bush does not relate to Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations” in the way that he does not 
want to give up American values nor does he want to give up American sovereignty. On the other hand he 
seeks cooperation when it is in American interest and this contradicts Huntington’s concept of 
“Civilizations”. (See Page 33) William J. Clinton does not relate to Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”. 
Unlike Huntington Clinton see a united world under the leadership of the UN. In this way he seeks 
cooperation by giving up America’s sovereignty. (See Page 36) George W. Bush is the President that 
expresses the closest relation to Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”. His speech underlines the idea that 
America is a sovereign state with superior values. These values are according to the speech universal and 
needs to be spread to other civilizations as well. (See Page 39) 
Cooperation with the international society is a major part of Clinton’s belief system. He differs from both 
Huntington and the other Presidents. He emphasizes the value of the UN and worldwide cooperation 
through this organisation. Both H. W. Bush and W. Bush highlight the importance of American sovereignty 
within their belief systems. H. W. Bush separates himself from W. Bush, by promoting cooperation in his 
near core belief. (See Page 50). Even though the concept of “Civilizations”, as expressed by Huntington, can 
be detected in two of the President’s belief systems it is not clear if Huntington have been part of a political 
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subsystem, or an advocacy coalition. Due to this uncertainty the influence of Huntington’s concept of 
“Civilizations” cannot clearly be linked to the American foreign policy of the Presidents. (see page 56)  
The Presidents perceive the concept of “Civilizations” differently. Clinton sees the world as one civilization 
with many cultural differences. H. W. Bush acknowledges other civilizations as long as they cooperate with 
America on American terms and has something to offer his own country. W. Bush does like Huntington 
deny the acknowledgement of values in other civilizations. Furthermore the concept of “Civilization” can be 
traced in the Presidents’ belief systems. Just like the discourse analyses conclude, the Presidents relate to 
Huntington’s concept of “Civilization” and the analysis of the belief systems concludes similar points. 
Clinton expresses a joint belief system concerning international cooperation and the UN as a law- and 
decision maker and thereby disagrees with Huntington. H. W. Bush partially fits with the “Civilization” 
concept, due to his deep core belief. The deep core belief is rooted in the concept of multiple civilizations, 
but is otherwise ignoring the other civilizations. W. Bush’s deep core belief only accepts his own, the 
Western, civilization’s values as being true. This highly relates to Huntington’s concept of “Civilizations”.  
As earlier concluded there is no clear evidence whether Huntington has been a part of a political subsystem 
close to the Presidents, and this uncertainty makes it impossible to conclude if Huntington actually has 
influenced the Presidents directly. Even though it is not possible to prove if Huntington has influenced the 
Presidents, Huntington may have influenced the Presidents in certain ways.  
To gain further knowledge on the subject one could investigate more speeches from each of the Presidents 
or focus on a single President. Furthermore, one could change the assignment by focusing on another 
relationship than the one between America from the Western civilization and Iraq from the Islamic 
civilization. One example could be the relationship between China from the Sinic civilization, and America 
from the Western. 
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Samuel P. Huntington, 81, Political Scientist, Is Dead  
By TAMAR LEWIN 
Published: December 28, 2008  
Samuel P. Huntington, an influential political scientist who taught at Harvard for 
more than a half-century, produced new analyses of domestic and international 
conflicts, and served as a mentor to dozens of prominent policy makers and 
academics, died Wednesday on Martha’s Vineyard. He was 81.  
  
His death was announced by Harvard, where he was the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor.  
Dr. Huntington was a prolific author whose writings helped shape American views on civilian-military 
relations, political development, comparative government and, in a 1996 book hailed as prescient after the 
9/11 attacks, the global clash of cultures.  
“He was an original thinker and without a doubt one of the most influential thinkers in politics for the last 
50 years,” said Henry Rosovsky, an emeritus professor of economics at Harvard and a longtime friend of Dr. 
Huntington. “I think the key to his importance is that he wrote many books, every one of them dealing with 
a centrally important issue of our time. That’s a pretty big order.”  
Dr. Huntington helped found Foreign Policy magazine, served as president of the American Political Science 
Association and founded the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard.  
Dr. Huntington was not solely a creature of the academy, though: he was a foreign policy adviser in Hubert 
H. Humphrey’s 1968 campaign for president. In 1977 and 1978, he served in the Carter White House as 
coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council.  
A lifelong Democrat, Dr. Huntington met his wife of 51 years, Nancy Arkelyan Huntington, when they were 
working together on a speech for the presidential hopeful Adlai E. Stevenson. Mrs. Huntington said that on 
domestic matters, her husband was always a classic liberal. But on foreign policy, he was widely seen as a 
hawkish conservative, although one who opposed the invasion of Iraq and had little sympathy for the 
neoconservatives of the Bush administration. 
Dr. Huntington, who had been in poor health for years, retired from teaching last year, saying in his 
retirement letter to the university’s president that it was difficult for him to imagine a more rewarding or 
enjoyable career than teaching at Harvard, “particularly teaching undergraduates.”  
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“He loved teaching undergraduates, right up to the end,” Mrs. Huntington said. “He loved that they would 
speak out. And he was a mentor to so many young scholars — Francis Fukuyama, Michael Desch at Notre 
Dame, Steve Rosen at Harvard, Eliot Cohen at the State Department, Fareed Zakaria.”  
Born in New York City on April 18, 1927, the son of a journalist and a writer, Samuel Phillips Huntington 
attended Stuyvesant High School, graduated from Yale at 18, served briefly in the Army, did graduate work 
at the University of Chicago and Harvard, and began teaching government at Harvard when he was 23.  
Dr. Huntington wrote, co-wrote or edited 17 books and dozens of scholarly articles, many of which 
attracted fierce criticism. 
In 1957, Dr. Huntington published “The Soldier and the State,” which examined the balance of power 
between civilians and the military, inspired by President Harry S. Truman’s 1951 firing of Gen. Douglas 
MacArthur for publicly disagreeing with his Korean War policy.  
For the first time, but not the last, Mrs. Huntington said, Dr. Huntington came under criticism from both 
ideological sides, with liberals attacking the book as militaristic and conservatives upset by the emphasis on 
civilian control.  
“It was extremely controversial,” said Jorge Domínguez, the vice provost for international affairs at 
Harvard. “He wrote in admiration of the U.S. military, but also insisted on the importance of civilian 
control.”  
By the late 1960s, Dr. Huntington had turned his attention to foreign affairs. His 1969 book “Political Order 
in Changing Societies,” still widely used in graduate seminars, analyzed political and economic development 
in the third world.  
In recent years, Dr. Huntington was best known — and, since 9/11, acclaimed — for “The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,” a 1996 book based on a 1993 Foreign Affairs article. The 
book predicted that in the post-cold-war world, violent conflict would arise from cultural and religious 
differences among the major civilizations.  
The spread of American pop culture, he wrote, did not mean the spread of American attitudes. The book 
has an almost uncanny image of what was to come: “Somewhere in the Middle East, a half-dozen young 
men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, listening to rap, and between their bows to Mecca, 
putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner.”  
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True to form, Dr. Huntington’s most recent book, “Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National 
Identity,” raised something of a ruckus with its argument that America has been, and will best flourish, as 
an Anglo-Protestant nation.  
In addition to his wife, Dr. Huntington is survived by his sons, Nicholas Phillips Huntington of Newton, 
Mass., and Timothy Mayo Huntington of Boston; his daughters-in-law, Kelly Brown Huntington and Noelle 
Lally Huntington; and four grandchildren. 
A version of this obituary appeared in Sunday’s late editions. 
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction: 
Correction: December 30, 2008  
An obituary on Monday about Samuel P. Huntington, a political scientist, misidentified the magazine that 
ran a 1993 article by Dr. Huntington on which he based his acclaimed book “The Clash of Civilizations and 
the Remaking of World Order.” It was Foreign Affairs, not Foreign Policy.  
A version of this article appeared in print on December 29, 2008, on page B8 of the New 
York edition. 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/education/29huntington.html 
 
Appendix 2 
 1 
The Fraternity of Civilizations: Prospects for Dialogue 
by Maryam Sakeenah / July 27th, 2009 
The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis may stand refuted as it very well is, but “refuting the Clash of 
Civilizations thesis will not stop the Clash of Civilizations concepts being applied to the War on Terror. 
The issue therefore is not how one can refute it, but how one can challenge its application in the world 
today.”1 The fallacies at the heart of the Clash of Civilizations thesis need to be brought out, refuted 
and transcended, and possibilities of seeking common grounds explored. Edward Said warns, “Unless 
we emphasize and maximize the spirit of humanistic exchange, profound existential commitment and 
labour on behalf of the ‘Other’, we are going to end up superficially and stridently banging the drum 
for the superiority of ‘our’ culture in opposition to all others.” 2  
With all the talk of the Clash of Civilizations, the need for an alternative paradigm which does not use a 
fallacious abstraction as a justification to extend power and influence is underscored. With the current 
state of things as they stand, we may be moving towards the clash that Huntington predicted, but the 
understanding that such a clash is not inevitable, and that it does not have to be so, is extremely 
important. Such a clash, if approaching, can and must be prevented. There is need for understanding, 
co operation and dialogue on both sides. Unity and tolerance for each other, respect for cultures or 
religions that may be different is required. Intellectuals, writers, scholars, academics, the media and 
political leadership have a very important duty to highlight the grounds for co operation between 
cultures and civilizations.  
This said, however, the imperatives of a successful and effective framework for dialogue between 
civilizations must first be established, otherwise all attempts to create an alliance between civilizations 
through dialogue will be little more than chasing an illusory ideal. Dieter Senghaas points out the 
flawed strategy in contemporary attempts at bringing civilizational representatives to the talking table. 
He contends that participants in the dialogues sponsored by the West (as in fact all dialogues have 
been, so far) are not true representatives of the sides to the conflict. Particularly, Muslim 
representatives in the Dialogue are almost invariably those of the West’s choosing — believers in a 
‘moderated’ Islam which does not enjoy any sizeable following in the Muslim world: “On the whole, 
the Muslim participants are not hard-boiled representatives of Orthodox Islam. They are all the 
representatives of a ‘modern’ Islam (whatever that means).”3 On the other hand, Senghaas notes, 
Western participants are rather naive and unaware of the Muslim standpoint, with little to offer. Such 
a dialogue, as Senghaas terms it, is ‘intellectually exhausted’, leading to a dead end.  
Another danger the West needs to guard against for a genuine dialogue between civilizations is the 
belief in one’s own culture to be essentially unique and exclusive. The West must pull itself out of the 
Cold War mentality of creating and bloating up enemy images in order to direct an ambitious foreign 
policy at an adversary — real or imagined. The West should reject attempts at demonization of the 
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enemy and understand that its version of modernity cannot be imposed on the Muslim world. It must 
allow other communities to develop according to their own orientation and essential values. Besides, 
the West must engage with authentic, popular representatives of the Muslim world: “An intellectual 
debate should rather be dealing intensively with the concepts of the democratic representatives of the 
Islamic world… How do writers, scientists, politicians, the representatives of social and especially 
religious groups envisage a desirable political constitution for their increasingly complex societies?”4  
On both sides of the current divide, voices of conciliation, tolerance and peacemaking need to be 
empowered over and above the call to isolate and avenge. Religion has a very significant role in the 
process of reconciliation. A number of religious personalities, scholars, organisations and institutions 
are engaged in the task of reconciliation, peacemaking and rapproachment through religion. However, 
their contribution and potential has largely been unacknowledged and unrecognized: “We do not 
know most of these people, nor do we understand their impact, because we in the West have had a 
tendency in the modern period to view religion as only the problem in the human relations of civil 
society, never part of solutions.”5 However, it is also true on the other hand that religion is also 
misused for generating violence, hatred and conflict. Religion, therefore, has the potential both for 
peacemaking and conflict resolution as well as violence and conflict. It is the peacemaking and 
conciliatory role of religion that ought to be highlighted and emphatically asserted, through 
interpretation of the sources of religion:  
“At the end of the day, it will come down to interpretation, selection and the hermeneutic direction of 
religious communities. That, in turn, is deeply tied up with questions of the economic and 
psychological health of their members, the wounds of history, and the decisions of key leaders to 
direct their communities’ deepest beliefs, practices and doctrines towards healing and reconciliation 
or towards hatred and violence.” 5  
This can help create a global civil society based on the sanctity of human rights and the necessity of 
conflict resolution. However, to truly accord that position and role to religion, it must be learnt that 
“Religion does not kill. Religion does not rape women, destroy buildings and institutions. Only 
individuals do those things.”6 This is particularly true for the West to understand in its perception of 
Islam which has, unfortunately, plummeted sharply after September 11, 2001, bringing the prospects 
for a clash closer. Instead of viewing violence as an intrinsically ‘Muslim’ phenomenon, the West needs 
to take responsibility for ill advised policy victimizing Muslims that has raised apprehension and 
mistrust in the Muslim world.  
In his speech at the ‘Dialogue Between Civilizations’, President Khatami spoke of Islam’s role in 
peacemaking and arbitrating between civilizations:  
“I should also highlight one of the most important sources that enriched Iranian thought and culture, 
namely Islam. Islamic spirituality is a global one. Islam has, all through the history, extended a global 
Appendix 2 
 3 
invitation to all the humanity. The Islamic emphasis on humane quality, and its disdain for such 
elements as birth and blood, had conquered the hearts of those yearning for justice and freedom…”7  
Several writers and intellectuals throughout history have recognized the extraordinary potential of 
Islam as an arbiter between civilizations through its emphasis on equality, justice and brotherhood 
that goes beyond all distinctions of nationalism, race or creed. According to H.A. R Gibb:  
“But Islam has a still further service to render to the cause of humanity. It stands after all nearer to the 
real East than Europe does, and it possesses a magnificent tradition of inter-racial understanding and 
cooperation. No other society has such a record of success uniting in an equality of status, of 
opportunity, and of endeavours so many and so various races of mankind … Islam has still the power to 
reconcile apparently irreconcilable elements of race and tradition. If ever the opposition of the great 
societies of East and West is to be replaced by cooperation, the mediation of Islam is an indispensable 
condition. In its hands lies very largely the solution of the problem with which Europe is faced in its 
relation with East. If they unite, the hope of a peaceful issue is immeasurably enhanced.” 8  
Ample evidence for the aforesaid is present in the sources of Islam. According to Islamic tradition, the 
Prophet (PBUH), in his Last Sermon made to the entirety of his living followers at that point in time 
said:  
“O people! Verily, Allah says, ‘O mankind! We have indeed created you from a single male and a 
female, and then We made you into nations and tribes so that you may recognize (or identify) each 
other. Indeed, the most honoured among you in the Sight of Allah is the one who is the most 
righteous.’(In the light of this verse), no Arab has a superiority over a non Arab, nor does a non Arab 
have any superiority over an Arab; and a black does not have any superiority over a white, nor is a 
white superior to a black, except by one thing: righteousness. Remember, all human beings are the 
sons and daughters of Adam (A.S), and Adam (A.S) was made from dust. Be warned! All (false) claims 
of blood and of wealth are under my feet." 9  
The huge stumbling block towards an understanding of Islam as an egalitarian, emancipatory, 
humanistic tradition in the West is the Orientalist lens with which the West has always viewed Islam. 
Due to a very flippant, superficial understanding of it, violence in the Muslim world is seen as intrinsic 
to Islam and Muslim society, while the role and responsibility of the West in provoking militancy 
through its policies is overlooked. This mindset becomes obvious in the Palestine-Israel conflict, a 
weeping sore in the modern world which embodies in itself all the prejudice, misunderstanding, hate, 
mistrust with which human beings have viewed others on the basis of difference in religion or race or 
country. Karen Armstrong states,  
“It is not sufficient for us in the West to support or condemn parties to the conflict. We are also 
involved and must make our own attitudes our prime responsibility… Crusading is not a lost medieval 
tradition: it has survived in different forms in both Europe and the United States and we must accept 
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that our own views are blinkered and prejudiced. The prophets of Israel, the parents of all three faiths, 
proclaimed the necessity of creating a new heart and a new soul, which was far more important than 
external conformity. So too today. External political solutions are not enough. All three of the 
participants in the struggle must create a different attitude, a new heart and spirit. In the Christian 
West we must try to make the painful migration from our old aggressions and embark on the long 
journey towards a new understanding and a new self.” 10  
Overcoming this stumbling block requires acknowledgement of the West’s debt to the Orient and to 
Islam, and reaching the realization that Islam in fact is central and not extrinsic to Western civilization. 
In his speech to the Muslim world, U.S President Barack Obama mentioned Europe and America’s debt 
to Islam:  
“As a student of history, I also know civilization’s debt to Islam. It was Islam — at places like Al-Azhar 
University — that carried the light of learning through so many centuries, paving the way for Europe’s 
Renaissance and Enlightenment. It was innovation in Muslim communities that developed the order of 
algebra; our magnetic compass and tools of navigation; our mastery of pens and printing; our 
understanding of how disease spreads and how it can be healed. And throughout history, Islam has 
demonstrated through words and deeds the possibilities of religious tolerance and racial equality. 
I know, too, that Islam has always been a part of America’s story. The first nation to recognize my 
country was Morocco. In signing the Treaty of Tripoli in 1796, our second President John Adams wrote, 
‘The United States has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of 
Muslims.’ And since our founding, American Muslims have enriched the United States.” 11  
The West needs to reinterpret history and do away with the narrow, parochial understanding of an 
exclusively ‘Western’ individualism that its history celebrates. It needs to acknowledge the debt, for 
only through that will mankind be able to seek the common thread buried beneath the morass of clash 
and conflict. Effort needs to be made to create the realization in the Western mind, of the historically 
attested fact that “The Western heritage is not simply Judaeo-Christian, but rather Judaeo-Christian-
Islamic. Islam belongs to the same Abrahamic family of religions as Judaism and Christianity, and 
modern Western civilization has inherited a large part of Islamic intellectual and scientific culture.”12  
The task ahead is to overcome the stumbling blocs in order to acquire a balanced world view, through 
which to strive to reach a middle ground on the basis of a system of sharing, exchange and 
intercultural communication between civilizations on an egalitarian basis. At the heart of the process is 
the understanding that we may be different, but we also share our humanity, and must make the most 
of this shared, indissoluble bond.  
This does not mean, however, that personal identities ought to be diluted, distinctions erased, barriers 
eliminated. That is neither practical nor advisable. What is needed is a delicate balance between 
civilizational (inclusive of religion, culture and all other identities short of singular humanness) and 
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human identity. Edward Said reiterated the same concept when asked what commonalities can unite 
the human race:  
“There are already commonalities that need to be recognized. I do not, however, suggest that 
differences should be eliminated. Things cannot be flattened out and homogenized. However, the 
other extreme is that everything is clashing. I think that is a prescription for war, and Huntington says 
that. The other alternative is coexistence with the preservation of difference. We have to respect and 
live with our differences. I do not suggest a unified, simplified, reduced culture, but the preservation of 
differences while learning to coexist in peace.” 2  
The potential and promise of Islam in fostering the ‘fraternity’ or the ‘alliance’ between civilizations is 
immense, as in fact, Islam has achieved this tremendous undertaking at several high points in its 
history. Spain under Muslims is an ideal worth emulating. Malaysian Professor Osman Bakar states,  
“Was not the civilization built in Spain by Muslims, Jews and Christians under the banner of Islam a 
universal civilization? A number of Jewish and Christian thinkers think so. Max Dimont makes the 
remarkable claim that the Jewish Golden Age in the medieval period coincided with the Golden Age of 
Islam, thus implying that what Muslims, Jews and Christians had built together within the Islamic 
civilization was truly universal in nature. There exists among some European scholars nostalgia for the 
Andalusian culture and civilization. They wish to return to the universality of Andalusia because post 
modern Western civilization has become particularistic and exclusionary.” 13  
Despite the essential differences between Islamic and Non Islamic tradition, historically Islam has 
never had ‘adjustment problems’ or difficulties in creating pluralistic societies where peoples of 
diverse religious traditions have lived together and prospered. In fact, Islam has a rich pluralistic 
tradition unsurpassed by any other civilization. It has a vast experience of interaction and alliance with 
non Muslim communities. Instances of conflict between Muslims and Non Muslims have never been, it 
must be observed, over ‘civilizational differences’. The idea, therefore, that Islam’s differences in 
worldview with non Islamic civilizations makes a clash inevitable is falsified by the history of Islam 
itself. Rather, the history of Islam presents a veritable model of a ‘world civilization’, as stated by 
Professor Bakar:  
“Huntington’s view that the idea of the possibility of a universal civilization is exclusively Western 
conception is not supported by history. It is a historical fact that Islam built the first comprehensive 
universal civilization in history even if we go by all the modern criteria of universality. Islam was the 
first civilization to have geographical and cultural borders with all the major contemporary civilizations 
of the world, and it was Islam that had the most extensive encounter with other civilizations.” 14  
Where, then, does a Clash emerge? It emerges as a corollary to interventionist, adventurist, 
exploitative policies vis a vis the Muslim world by the ascendant West steeped in the compulsions of 
its espoused Materialism and Capitalism. The Clash is not inevitable, but it can become possible if such 
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policies are mindlessly and relentlessly pursued by the West and if the Muslim world does not engage 
in self criticism and undertake a rediscovery of the pristine message of Islam. As long as the West 
keeps pursuing its ill advised course, insecurity and militant responses will proliferate among the 
Muslims. In such a case, Muslim opinion leaders will be compelled to rally together their people for 
strengthening, fortifying and gearing up for the West’s assault on what is most precious to them. Given 
the insensitivity and superficial grasp of the West over the prevalent mood in the Muslim world, the 
vicious cycle of hostility will go on. This is exactly the self-destructive path towards the Clash of 
Civilizations which in the long run will be in the interest of none. 
1. Michael Dunn, ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the War on Terror,’ 49th Parallel, Vol.20 (Winter 2006-2007). [↩] 
2. Remarked by Professor Edward W Said in his 1998 lecture titled “The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations” at University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, United States of America. [↩] [↩] 
3. Senghaas, Dieter, The Clash Within Civilizations, Routledge, London, 2002., p. 105. [↩] 
4. Ibid, p. 107. [↩] 
5. Marc Gopin, “Religion and International Relations at the Crossroads,” International Studies Review, Vol III issue III, Fall 2001. [↩] 
[↩] 
6. Stated by Giandomino Picco, quoted in United Nations Year of Dialogue Between Civilizations 2001, Introduction, 
www.un.org/dialogue [↩] 
7. “Empathy and Compassion,” The Iranian, September 8, 2000. [↩] 
8. H.A.R. Gibb, Whither Islam, London, 1932, p. 379. [↩] 
9. Quoted by Martin Lings, Muhammad (SAW): His Life Based on the Earliest Sources, Vermont, Rochester (USA), Inner Traditions, 
2006. [↩] 
10. Karen Armstrong, The Crusades and their Impact on Todays World, New York, Random House, Inc, 2001, p.539. [↩] 
11. ABS-CBN News, Text of Obama’s speech to Muslim world, June 4, 2009. [↩] 
12. Osman Bakar, Islam and Civilizational Dialogue, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya, 1997, p.42. [↩] 
13. Ibid, p. 10. [↩] 
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Press Information 
 
Samuel P. Huntington died Wednesday (Dec. 24) at an Oak Bluffs, Mass., skilled nursing 
facility near his home in West Tisbury, Mass., on Martha's Vineyard. He was 81. 
 
For press inquiries or for digital photos, please contact Beth Baiter by telephone at 
+1.617.495.4432 or by email at bbaiter@wcfia.harvard.edu. 
 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Statement: 
 
Samuel P. Huntington, Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard 
University, was one of the giants of political science worldwide during the past half 
century. He had a knack for asking the crucially important but often inconvenient 
question. He had the talent and skill to formulate analyses that stood the test of time. 
 
The book that brought him to the public eye, and public controversy, The Clash of 
Civilizations (1996), painted on the broadest global canvass. It focused on the 
significance of religious and other cultural values as ways of understanding cohesion and 
division in the world. It was the intellectual foundation in 2003 for his opposition to the 
U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq. This book anticipated reasons for challenges and 
tragedies that unfolded in Iraq during the past five years. 
 
Among political scientists, two other books were particularly influential. His Political 
Order in Changing Societies (1968) challenged the orthodoxies of the 1960s in the field 
of development. Huntington showed that the lack of political order and authority were 
among the most serious debilities the world over. The degree of order, rather than the 
form of the political regime, mattered most. Moreover, it was false that "all good things 
go together" because the relationships between political order, democracy, economic 
growth, and education often created complex challenges and often undercut each other. In 
the decades the followed, this book remained the most frequently assigned text in 
research university seminars to introduce graduate students to comparative politics. 
 
Huntington's The Third Wave (1991) looked at similar questions from a different 
perspective, namely, that the form of the political regime -- democracy or dictatorship -- 
did matter. The metaphor in his title referred to the cascade of dictator-toppling 
democracy-creating episodes that peopled the world from the mid 1970s to the early 
1990s, and he gave persuasive reasons for this turn of events well before the fall of the 
Berlin wall. 
 
Huntington's first book, The Soldier and the State (1957), examined the question of 
civilian authority over the armed forces, or the lack thereof. Huntington's principal 
interest was to understand what he called professional "objective civilian control" over 
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the military in the United States but, in so doing, he shed much light on the successful 
evolution of civilian authority over the military historically in Europe and also in 
communist countries. 
 
Huntington's books revealed his mind but ordinarily he made readers work harder to 
figure out how he felt. He was a highly disciplined author, a stylist of English language 
prose, and a master craftsman of arguments and their texts. Yet, in his last book, Who Are 
We? (2004), he left no doubt where he stood on the question that then concerned him. He 
was an American patriot, and he would like to be remembered for this faith as well. 
Samuel Huntington graduated from Yale College in 1946 and earned a Ph.D. in political 
science from Harvard in 1951. He spent the rest of his career teaching at Harvard, except 
for a period at Columbia University from 1958 to 1962. He served as Chairman of the 
Harvard Government Department (1967-69; 1970-71) and as director of the 
(Weatherhead) Center for International Affairs (1978-1989). He founded Harvard's Olin 
Institute for Strategic Studies and served as its director from 1989-1999. He was the 
Chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies (1996-2004).  
 
Mentor to generations of scholars in widely divergent fields, he was the author or co-
author of a total of seventeen books, on American government, democratization, national 
security and strategic issues, political and economic development, cultural factors in 
world politics and American national identity. He wrote insightfully about war and peace, 
development and decay, democracy and dictatorship, cultures and structures, migration 
and displacement, and many other topics. His graduate students teach at the world's 
leading research universities and have served in governments and international 
organizations. Shy in demeanor, Huntington was feisty at seminars and conferences, 
welcoming debate, and relished the exploration, critique, and defense of complex ideas. 
A life-long Democrat, he was foreign policy advisor to Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
in his 1968 presidential campaign and served in the Carter Administration on the 
National Security Council staff as Coordinator of Security Planning (1977-78). He also 
co-founded and edited Foreign Policy magazine. He served as president of the American 
Political Science Association (1986-1987) and received the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas 
for Improving World Order. 
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Quotation List 
 
Reaction to Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996): 
 
“Sam Huntington, one of the West’s most eminent political scientists, presents a 
challenging framework for understanding the realities of global politics in the next 
century. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is one of the 
most important books to have emerged since the end of the Cold War.” 
 
- Henry Kissinger 
 
“An intellectual tour de force: bold, imaginative, and provocative. A seminal work 
that will revolutionize our understanding of international affairs.” 
 
- Zbigniew Brzezinski 
 
Reaction to Huntington’s passing: 
 
“Sam Huntington was one of the giants of American intellectual life of the last half 
century. His contributions ranged across the whole field of political science, from the 
deeply theoretical to the intensely applied.  Over the years, he mentored a large share 
of America's leading strategic thinkers, and he built enduring institutions of 
intellectual excellence. What was most rare about Sam, however, was his ability to 
combine intensely held, vigorously argued views with an engaging openness to 
contrary evidence and argument.  Harvard has lost a towering figure, and his 
colleagues have lost a very good friend.” 
 
- Robert Putnam, Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
 
“Samuel Huntington's brilliance was recognized by the academics and statesmen 
around the world who read his books.  But he was loved by those who knew him well 
because he combined a fierce loyalty to his principles and friends with a happy 
eagerness to be confronted with sharp opposition to his own views, if the opposing 
arguments were well formed, of course.” 
 
- Stephen P. Rosen, Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military 
Affairs and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard 
 
“Sam was the kind of scholar that made Harvard a great university. People all over 
the world studied and debated his ideas. I believe he was clearly the most influential 
political scientists of the last 50 or so years.” 
 
- Henry Rosovsky, Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor, Emeritus at 
Harvard 
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Samuel Huntington in his own words: 
 
From The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996): 
 
“The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion … 
but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget 
this fact; non-Westerners never do.” 
 
“In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in 
the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; 
and it is dangerous.” 
 
“The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a 
different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture 
and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the 
CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose 
people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their 
superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture 
throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam 
and the West.” 
 
From Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004): 
 
“Cultural America is under siege. And as the Soviet experience illustrates, ideology is 
a weak glue to hold together people otherwise lacking racial, ethnic, and cultural 
sources of community.” 
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Address Before a Joint Session of Congress 
(September 11, 1990) 
George H. W. Bush 
"It is Iraq against the world." Bush describes Saddam Hussein's actions in the Persian Gulf as 
"inhumane aggression." He demands that Iraq pull out of Kuwait. 5 
This transcript contains the published text of the speech, not the actual words spoken. There may be 
some differences between the transcript and the audio/video content. 
 
 
Mr. President and Mr. Speaker and Members of the United States Congress, distinguished guests, 10 
fellow Americans, thank you very much for that warm welcome. We gather tonight, witness to 
events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2d, 
following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful 
Iraqi army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi 
troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was 15 
then that I decided to act to check that aggression.  
 
At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that distant desert and on distant 
seas, side by side with the forces of more than 20 other nations. They are some of the finest men 
and women of the United States of America. And they're doing one terrific job. These valiant 20 
Americans were ready at a moment's notice to leave their spouses and their children, to serve on the 
front line halfway around the world. They remind us who keeps America strong: they do. In the 
trying circumstances of the Gulf, the morale of our service men and women is excellent. In the face 
of danger, they're brave, they're well-trained, and dedicated.  
 25 
A soldier, Private First Class Wade Merritt of Knoxville, Tennessee, now stationed in Saudi Arabia, 
wrote his parents of his worries, his love of family, and his hope for peace. But Wade also wrote, "I 
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am proud of my country and its firm stance against inhumane aggression. I am proud of my army 
and its men. I am proud to serve my country." Well, let me just say, Wade, America is proud of you 
and is grateful to every soldier, sailor, marine, and airman serving the cause of peace in the Persian 30 
Gulf. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell; the Chiefs here 
tonight; our commander in the Persian Gulf, General Schwartzkopf; and the men and women of the 
Department of Defense. What a magnificent job you all are doing. And thank you very, very much 
from a grateful people. I wish I could say that their work is done. But we all know it's not.  
 35 
So, if there ever was a time to put country before self and patriotism before party, the time is now. 
And let me thank all Americans, especially those here in this Chamber tonight, for your support for 
our armed forces and for their mission. That support will be even more important in the days to 
come. So, tonight I want to talk to you about what's at stake—what we must do together to defend 
civilized values around the world and maintain our economic strength at home.  40 
 
Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear, our goals defined and familiar: Iraq must withdraw 
from Kuwait completely, immediately, and without condition. Kuwait's legitimate government must 
be restored. The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be assured. And American citizens 
abroad must be protected. These goals are not ours alone. They've been endorsed by the United 45 
Nations Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most countries share our concern for 
principle. And many have a stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is not, as Saddam 
Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world.  
 
As you know, I've just returned from a very productive meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev. 50 
And I am pleased that we are working together to build a new relationship. In Helsinki, our joint 
statement affirmed to the world our shared resolve to counter Iraq's threat to peace. Let me quote: 
"We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international 
order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors." Clearly, no longer can a 
dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against 55 
aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun.  
 
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it 
is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these 
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troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the 60 
threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in 
which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A 
hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged 
across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite 
different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. 65 
A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world 
where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President 
Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world 
understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.  
 70 
The test we face is great, and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we 
seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of 
purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and 
potential despots around the world. America and the world must defend common vital interests—
and we will. America and the world must support the rule of law—and we will. America and the 75 
world must stand up to aggression—and we will. And one thing more: In the pursuit of these goals 
America will not be intimidated.  
 
Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the 
face of the Earth. We do not exaggerate. Nor do we exaggerate when we say Saddam Hussein will 80 
fail. Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's 
proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait 
would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its 
neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot 
permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.  85 
 
Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of 
tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. 
We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental 
truth. From the outset, acting hand in hand with others, we've sought to fashion the broadest 90 
possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation and 
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condemnation of Iraq is unprecedented. Armed forces from countries spanning four continents are 
there at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to deter and, if need be, to defend against attack. 
Moslems and non-Moslems, Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations stand shoulder to 
shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions.  95 
 
We can now point to five United Nations Security Council resolutions that condemn Iraq's 
aggression. They call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's 
legitimate government, and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving attempt to annex 
Kuwait. Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage 100 
against their will and in contravention of international law. It is a mockery of human decency to call 
these people "guests." They are hostages, and the whole world knows it.  
 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a dependable ally, said it all: "We do not bargain over hostages. 
We will not stoop to the level of using human beings as bargaining chips ever." Of course, of 105 
course, our hearts go out to the hostages and to their families. But our policy cannot change, and it 
will not change. America and the world will not be blackmailed by this ruthless policy.  
 
We're now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders. We owe much 
to the outstanding leadership of Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The United Nations is 110 
backing up its words with action. The Security Council has imposed mandatory economic sanctions 
on Iraq, designed to force Iraq to relinquish the spoils of its illegal conquest. The Security Council 
has also taken the decisive step of authorizing the use of all means necessary to ensure compliance 
with these sanctions. Together with our friends and allies, ships of the United States Navy are today 
patrolling Mideast waters. They've already intercepted more than 700 ships to enforce the sanctions. 115 
Three regional leaders I spoke with just yesterday told me that these sanctions are working. Iraq is 
feeling the heat. We continue to hope that Iraq's leaders will recalculate just what their aggression 
has cost them. They are cut off from world trade, unable to sell their oil. And only a tiny fraction of 
goods gets through.  
 120 
The communique with President Gorbachev made mention of what happens when the embargo is so 
effective that children of Iraq literally need milk or the sick truly need medicine. Then, under strict 
international supervision that guarantees the proper destination, then food will be permitted.  
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At home, the material cost of our leadership can be steep. That's why Secretary of State Baker and 125 
Treasury Secretary Brady have met with many world leaders to underscore that the burden of this 
collective effort must be shared. We are prepared to do our share and more to help carry that load; 
we insist that others do their share as well.  
 
The response of most of our friends and allies has been good. To help defray costs, the leaders of 130 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE—the United Arab Emirates—have pledged to provide our 
deployed troops with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also be provided to 
stalwart front-line nations, such as Turkey and Egypt. I am also heartened to report that this 
international response extends to the neediest victims of this conflict—those refugees. For our part, 
we've contributed $28 million for relief efforts. This is but a portion of what is needed. I commend, 135 
in particular, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and several European nations who have joined us in this purely 
humanitarian effort.  
 
There's an energy-related cost to be borne as well. Oil-producing nations are already replacing lost 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti output. More than half of what was lost has been made up. And we're getting 140 
superb cooperation. If producers, including the United States, continue steps to expand oil and gas 
production, we can stabilize prices and guarantee against hardship. Additionally, we and several of 
our allies always have the option to extract oil from our strategic petroleum reserves if conditions 
warrant. As I've pointed out before, conservation efforts are essential to keep our energy needs as 
low as possible. And we must then take advantage of our energy sources across the board: coal, 145 
natural gas, hydro, and nuclear. Our failure to do these things has made us more dependent on 
foreign oil than ever before. Finally, let no one even contemplate profiteering from this crisis. We 
will not have it.  
 
I cannot predict just how long it will take to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Sanctions will 150 
take time to have their full intended effect. We will continue to review all options with our allies, 
but let it be clear: we will not let this aggression stand.  
 
Our interest, our involvement in the Gulf is not transitory. It predated Saddam Hussein's aggression 
and will survive it. Long after all our troops come home—and we all hope it's soon, very soon—155 
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there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role 
then: to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-defense. And 
something else: to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and, above all, 
nuclear technologies.  
 160 
Let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is 
with Iraq's dictator and with his aggression. Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That's not a 
threat, that's not a boast, that's just the way it's going to be.  
 
Our ability to function effectively as a great power abroad depends on how we conduct ourselves at 165 
home. Our economy, our Armed Forces, our energy dependence, and our cohesion all determine 
whether we can help our friends and stand up to our foes. For America to lead, America must 
remain strong and vital. Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing; a 
woven piece, strongly bound as Old Glory. To revitalize our leadership, our leadership capacity, we 
must address our budget deficit—not after election day, or next year, but now.  170 
 
Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs would only make our fiscal deficit 
problem worse. That deficit was already greater than it should have been—a projected $232 billion 
for the coming year. It must—it will—be reduced.  
 175 
To my friends in Congress, together we must act this very month—before the next fiscal year 
begins on October 1st—to get America's economic house in order. The Gulf situation helps us 
realize we are more economically vulnerable than we ever should be. Americans must never again 
enter any crisis, economic or military, with an excessive dependence on foreign oil and an excessive 
burden of Federal debt.  180 
 
Most Americans are sick and tired of endless battles in the Congress and between the branches over 
budget matters. It is high time we pulled together and get the job done right. It's up to us to 
straighten this out. This job has four basic parts. First, the Congress should, this month, within a 
budget agreement, enact growth-oriented tax measures—to help avoid recession in the short term 185 
and to increase savings, investment, productivity, and competitiveness for the longer term. These 
measures include extending incentives for research and experimentation; expanding the use of 
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IRA's for new homeowners; establishing tax-deferred family savings accounts; creating incentives 
for the creation of enterprise zones and initiatives to encourage more domestic drilling; and, yes, 
reducing the tax rate on capital gains.  190 
 
And second, the Congress should, this month, enact a prudent multiyear defense program, one that 
reflects not only the improvement in East-West relations but our broader responsibilities to deal 
with the continuing risks of outlaw action and regional conflict. Even with our obligations in the 
Gulf, a sound defense budget can have some reduction in real terms; and we're prepared to accept 195 
that. But to go beyond such levels, where cutting defense would threaten our vital margin of safety, 
is something I will never accept. The world is still dangerous. And surely, that is now clear. 
Stability's not secure. American interests are far reaching. Interdependence has increased. The 
consequences of regional instability can be global. This is no time to risk America's capacity to 
protect her vital interests.  200 
 
And third, the Congress should, this month, enact measures to increase domestic energy production 
and energy conservation in order to reduce dependence on foreign oil. These measures should 
include my proposals to increase incentives for domestic oil and gas exploration, fuel-switching, 
and to accelerate the development of the Alaskan energy resources without damage to wildlife. As 205 
you know, when the oil embargo was imposed in the early 1970's, the United States imported 
almost 6 million barrels of oil a day. This year, before the Iraqi invasion, U.S. imports had risen to 
nearly 8 million barrels per day. And we'd moved in the wrong direction. And now we must act to 
correct that trend.  
 210 
And fourth, the Congress should, this month, enact a 5-year program to reduce the projected debt 
and deficits by $500 billion—that's by half a trillion dollars. And if, with the Congress, we can 
develop a satisfactory program by the end of the month, we can avoid the ax of sequester—deep 
across-the-board cuts that would threaten our military capacity and risk substantial domestic 
disruption. I want to be able to tell the American people that we have truly solved the deficit 215 
problem. And for me to do that, a budget agreement must meet these tests: It must include the 
measures I've recommended to increase economic growth and reduce dependence on foreign oil. It 
must be fair. All should contribute, but the burden should not be excessive for any one group of 
programs or people. It must address the growth of government's hidden liabilities. It must reform 
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the budget process and, further, it must be real.  220 
 
I urge Congress to provide a comprehensive 5-year deficit reduction program to me as a complete 
legislative package, with measures to assure that it can be fully enforced. America is tired of phony 
deficit reduction or promise-now, save-later plans. It is time for a program that is credible and real. 
And finally, to the extent that the deficit reduction program includes new revenue measures, it must 225 
avoid any measure that would threaten economic growth or turn us back toward the days of 
punishing income tax rates. That is one path we should not head down again.  
 
I have been pleased with recent progress, although it has not always seemed so smooth. But now it's 
time to produce. I hope we can work out a responsible plan. But with or without agreement from the 230 
budget summit, I ask both Houses of the Congress to allow a straight up-or-down vote on a 
complete $500-billion deficit reduction package not later than September 28. If the Congress cannot 
get me a budget, then Americans will have to face a tough, mandated sequester. I'm hopeful, in fact, 
I'm confident that the Congress will do what it should. And I can assure you that we in the 
executive branch will do our part.  235 
 
In the final analysis, our ability to meet our responsibilities abroad depends upon political will and 
consensus at home. This is never easy in democracies, for we govern only with the consent of the 
governed. And although free people in a free society are bound to have their differences, Americans 
traditionally come together in times of adversity and challenge.  240 
 
Once again, Americans have stepped forward to share a tearful goodbye with their families before 
leaving for a strange and distant shore. At this very moment, they serve together with Arabs, 
Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order. That's 
why they sweat and toil in the sand and the heat and the sun. If they can come together under such 245 
adversity, if old adversaries like the Soviet Union and the United States can work in common cause, 
then surely we who are so fortunate to be in this great Chamber—Democrats, Republicans, liberals, 
conservatives—can come together to fulfill our responsibilities here.  
 
Thank you. Good night. And God bless the United States of America.  250 
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Transcript: President Clinton explains 
Iraq strike 
December 16, 1998 
 
Earlier today, I ordered America´s armed forces to strike military and security targets in 5 
Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq´s nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors. 
Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the 
interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world. 
Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear 10 
arms, poison gas or biological weapons. 
I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national 
security team, to use force in Iraq; why we have acted now; and what we aim to 
accomplish. 
Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the 15 
United Nations weapons inspectors called UNSCOM. They are highly professional experts 
from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s capability to 
retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction, and to verify that Iraq does not 
attempt to rebuild that capability. 
The inspectors undertook this mission first 7.5 years ago at the end of the Gulf War when 20 
Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the ceasefire. 
The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries 
possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one 
big difference He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly unleashing chemical weapons 
against Iranian troops during a decade long war. Not only against soldiers, but against 25 
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civilians, firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. And 
not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish 
civilians in Northern Iraq. 
The international community had little doubt then and I have no doubt today that left 
unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again. 30 
The United States has patiently worked to preserve UNSCOM as Iraq has sought to avoid 
its obligation to cooperate with the inspectors. On occasion, we´ve had to threaten military 
force, and Saddam has backed down. 
Faced with Saddam´s latest act of defiance in late October, we built intensive diplomatic 
pressure on Iraq backed by overwhelming military force in the region. The UN Security 35 
Council voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam´s actions and to demand that he 
immediately come into compliance. 
Eight Arab nations Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates and Oman warned that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the 
consequences of defying the UN. 40 
When Saddam still failed to comply, we prepared to act militarily. It was only then at the 
last possible moment that Iraq backed down. It pledged to the UN that it had made, and I 
quote, a clear and unconditional decision to resume cooperation with the weapons 
inspectors. 
I decided then to call off the attack with our airplanes already in the air because Saddam 45 
had given in to our demands. I concluded then that the right thing to do was to use 
restraint and give Saddam one last chance to prove his willingness to cooperate. 
 
I made it very clear at that time what unconditional cooperation meant, based on existing 
UN resolutions and Iraq´s own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great 50 
Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be 
prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning. 
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Now over the past three weeks, the UN weapons inspectors have carried out their plan for 
testing Iraq´s cooperation. The testing period ended this weekend, and last night, 
UNSCOMs chairman, Richard Butler, reported the results to UN Secretary General Annan. 55 
The conclusions are stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing. 
In four out of the five categories set forth, Iraq has failed to cooperate. Indeed, it actually 
has placed new restrictions on the inspectors. Here are some of the particulars. 
Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites. For example, it shut off 
access to the headquarters of its ruling party and said it will deny access to the party´s 60 
other offices, even though UN resolutions make no exception for them and UNSCOM has 
inspected them in the past. 
Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOMs ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, 
Iraq obstructed UNSCOMs effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons 
program. 65 
It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and 
photocopying documents and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOMs 
questions. 
Prior to the inspection of another site, Iraq actually emptied out the building, removing not 
just documents but even the furniture and the equipment. 70 
Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by the inspectors. Indeed, 
we know that Iraq ordered the destruction of weapons related documents in anticipation of 
an UNSCOM inspection. 
As the UNSCOM reports conclude, and again I quote, Iraq´s conduct ensured that no 
progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament. 75 
In light of this experience, and in the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably 
be recorded again that the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by 
the Security Council with respect to Iraq´s prohibited weapons program. 
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In short, the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be 
a sham. 80 
Saddam´s deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming 
Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors. 
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and 
the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last 
chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize 85 
the chance. 
And so we had to act and act now. 
Let me explain why. 
First, without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild 
its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years. 90 
Second, if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he 
would conclude that the international community led by the United States has simply lost 
its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction, and 
someday make no mistake he will use it again as he has in the past. 
Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we 95 
turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam 
will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspection system 
that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut 
the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region. 
That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team including the 100 
vice president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the 
secretary of state and the national security adviser I have ordered a strong, sustained 
series of air strikes against Iraq. 
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They are designed to degrade Saddam´s capacity to develop and deliver weapons of 
mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors. 105 
At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam. If you act recklessly, 
you will pay a heavy price. We acted today because, in the judgment of my military 
advisers, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for 
Saddam to prepare. 
If we had delayed for even a matter of days from Chairman Butlers report, we would have 110 
given Saddam more time to disperse his forces and protect his weapons. 
Also, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military 
action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim world and, therefore, 
would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the 
Middle East. 115 
That is something we wanted very much to avoid without giving Iraq a month head start to 
prepare for potential action against it. 
Finally, our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now 
is the time to strike. I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system 
now and comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. But we have to be 120 
prepared that he will not, and we must deal with the very real danger he poses. 
So we will pursue a long term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction 
and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people. 
First, we must be prepared to use force again if Saddam takes threatening actions, such 
as trying to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, 125 
threatening his neighbors, challenging allied aircraft over Iraq or moving against his own 
Kurdish citizens. 
The credible threat to use force, and when necessary, the actual use of force, is the surest 
way to contain Saddam´s weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression 
and prevent another Gulf War. 130 
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Second, so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international 
community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam 
more than 120 billion resources that would have been used to rebuild his military. The 
sanctions system allows Iraq to sell oil for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian 
supplies for the Iraqi people. 135 
We have no quarrel with them. But without the sanctions, we would see the oil for food 
program become oil for tanks, resulting in a greater threat to Iraq´s neighbors and less 
food for its people. 
The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the wellbeing of 
his people, the peace of his region, and the security of the world. 140 
The best way to end that threat once and for all is with anew Iraqi government a 
government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights 
of its people. Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our 
engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively 
and prudently. 145 
The decision to use force is never cost free. Whenever American forces are placed in 
harms way, we risk the loss of life. And while our strikes are focused on Iraq´s military 
capabilities, there will be unintended Iraqi casualties. 
Indeed, in the past, Saddam has intentionally placed Iraqi civilians in harms way in a 
cynical bid to sway international opinion. 150 
We must be prepared for these realities. At the same time, Saddam should have 
absolutely no doubt if he lashes out at his neighbors, we will respond forcefully. 
Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If 
Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the 
future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors. He will make war on his own people. 155 
And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, 
and he will use them. 
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Because were acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future. 
Let me close by addressing one other issue. Saddam Hussein and the other enemies of 
peace may have thought that the serious debate currently before the House of 160 
Representatives would distract Americans or weaken our resolve to face him down. 
But once more, the United States has proven that although we are never eager to use 
force, when we must act in Americas vital interests, we will do so. 
In the century were leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and 
community, fear and hope. Now, in the new century, we’ll have a remarkable opportunity 165 
to shape a future more peaceful than the past, but only if we stand strong against the 
enemies of peace. 
Tonight, the United States is doing just that. May God bless and protect the brave men 
and women who are carrying out this vital mission and their families. And may God bless 
America. 170 
 
http://articles.cnn.com/1998-12-16/politics/1998_12_16_transcripts_clinton_1_saddam-hussein-unscom-
iraq-strike?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS 
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President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq 
Have Ended  
Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln 
At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California  
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very much. Admiral Kelly, Captain 5 
Card, officers and sailors of the USS Abraham Lincoln, my fellow 
Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle 
of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. (Applause.) 
And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.  
In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and 10 
our coalition are proud of this accomplishment -- yet, it is you, the members of the United States 
military, who achieved it. Your courage, your willingness to face danger for your country and for each 
other, made this day possible. Because of you, our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has 
fallen, and Iraq is free. (Applause.)  
Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination 15 
of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not 
expect, and the world had not seen before. From distant bases 
or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that could destroy 
an enemy division, or strike a single bunker. Marines and 
soldiers charged to Baghdad across 350 miles of hostile 20 
ground, in one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in 
history. You have shown the world the skill and the might of 
the American Armed Forces.  
This nation thanks all the members of our coalition who joined in a noble cause. We thank the Armed 
Forces of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, who shared in the hardships of war. We thank all 25 
the citizens of Iraq who welcomed our troops and joined in the liberation of their own country. And 
tonight, I have a special word for Secretary Rumsfeld, for General Franks, and for all the men and 
women who wear the uniform of the United States: America is grateful for a job well done. (Applause.)  
The character of our military through history -- the daring of Normandy, the fierce courage of Iwo 
Jima, the decency and idealism that turned enemies into allies -- is fully present in this generation. 30 
  Video (Real)  
  Audio  
  En Español  
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When Iraqi civilians looked into the faces of our servicemen and women, they saw strength and 
kindness and goodwill. When I look at the members of the United States military, I see the best of our 
country, and I'm honored to be your Commander-in-Chief. (Applause.)  
In the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred of years of 
war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict 35 
casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces 
destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who started the conflict were safe until the final days. 
Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation.  
Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. 
With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence 40 
against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance 
when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent. (Applause.)  
In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the 
ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and 
intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their 45 
oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and 
women in every culture need liberty like they need food and 
water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity 
rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear. 
(Applause.)  50 
We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to 
parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing 
and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to 
account for their crimes. We've begun the search for hidden 
chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated. 55 
We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and 
schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for 
the Iraqi people. (Applause.)  
The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition 
will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq. (Applause.)  60 
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The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 -- and still 
goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men -- the shock troops of a hateful ideology -- gave America 
and the civilized world a glimpse of their ambitions. They imagined, in the words of one terrorist, that 
September the 11th would be the "beginning of the end of America." By seeking to turn our cities into 
killing fields, terrorists and their allies believed that they could destroy this nation's resolve, and force 65 
our retreat from the world. They have failed. (Applause.)  
In the battle of Afghanistan, we destroyed the Taliban, many terrorists, and the camps where they 
trained. We continue to help the Afghan people lay roads, restore hospitals, and educate all of their 
children. Yet we also have dangerous work to complete. As I speak, a Special Operations task force, led 
by the 82nd Airborne, is on the trail of the terrorists and those who seek to undermine the free 70 
government of Afghanistan. America and our coalition will finish what we have begun. (Applause.)  
From Pakistan to the Philippines to the Horn of Africa, we are hunting down al Qaeda killers. Nineteen 
months ago, I pledged that the terrorists would not escape the patient justice of the United States. And 
as of tonight, nearly one-half of al Qaeda's senior operatives have been captured or killed. (Applause.)  
The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al 75 
Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will 
gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more. (Applause.)  
In these 19 months that changed the world, our actions have been focused and deliberate and 
proportionate to the offense. We have not forgotten the victims of September the 11th -- the last phone 
calls, the cold murder of children, the searches in the rubble. With those attacks, the terrorists and 80 
their supporters declared war on the United States. And war is what they got. (Applause.)  
Our war against terror is proceeding according to principles that I have made clear to all: Any person 
involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy 
of this country, and a target of American justice. (Applause.)  
Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in 85 
the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes.  
Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass 
destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world -- and will be confronted. (Applause.)  
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And anyone in the world, including the Arab world, who works and sacrifices for freedom has a loyal 
friend in the United States of America. (Applause.)  90 
Our commitment to liberty is America's tradition -- 
declared at our founding; affirmed in Franklin 
Roosevelt's Four Freedoms; asserted in the 
Truman Doctrine and in Ronald Reagan's challenge 
to an evil empire. We are committed to freedom in 95 
Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in a peaceful Palestine. 
The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to 
undermine the appeal of terror in the world. 
Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to 
hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women 100 
turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American interests lead in the same 
direction: We stand for human liberty. (Applause.)  
The United States upholds these principles of security and freedom in many ways -- with all the tools 
of diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and finance. We're working with a broad coalition of 
nations that understand the threat and our shared responsibility to meet it. The use of force has been -105 
- and remains -- our last resort. Yet all can know, friend and foe alike, that our nation has a mission: We 
will answer threats to our security, and we will defend the peace. (Applause.)  
Our mission continues. Al Qaeda is wounded, not destroyed. The scattered cells of the terrorist 
network still operate in many nations, and we know from daily intelligence that they continue to plot 
against free people. The proliferation of deadly weapons remains a serious danger. The enemies of 110 
freedom are not idle, and neither are we. Our government has taken unprecedented measures to 
defend the homeland. And we will continue to hunt down the enemy before he can strike. (Applause.)  
The war on terror is not over; yet it is not endless. We do not know the day of final victory, but we 
have seen the turning of the tide. No act of the terrorists will change our purpose, or weaken our 
resolve, or alter their fate. Their cause is lost. Free nations will press on to victory. (Applause.)  115 
Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, 
following a battle, want nothing more than to return home. And that is your direction tonight. 
(Applause.) After service in the Afghan -- and Iraqi theaters of war -- after 100,000 miles, on the 
longest carrier deployment in recent history, you are homeward bound. (Applause.) Some of you will 
 
Click here for a USS Abraham Lincoln photo essay.  
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see new family members for the first time -- 150 babies were born while their fathers were on the 120 
Lincoln. Your families are proud of you, and your nation will welcome you. (Applause.)  
We are mindful, as well, that some good men and women are not making the journey home. One of 
those who fell, Corporal Jason Mileo, spoke to his parents five days before his death. Jason's father said, 
"He called us from the center of Baghdad, not to brag, but to tell us he loved us. Our son was a soldier."  
Every name, every life is a loss to our military, to our nation, and to the loved ones who grieve. There's 125 
no homecoming for these families. Yet we pray, in God's time, their reunion will come.  
Those we lost were last seen on duty. Their final act on this Earth was to fight a great evil and bring 
liberty to others. All of you -- all in this generation of our military -- have taken up the highest calling of 
history. You're defending your country, and protecting the innocent from harm. And wherever you go, 
you carry a message of hope -- a message that is ancient and ever new. In the words of the prophet 130 
Isaiah, "To the captives, 'come out,' -- and to those in darkness, 'be free.'"  
Thank you for serving our country and our cause. May God bless you all, and may God continue to 
bless America. (Applause.)  
END 6:27 P.M. PDT  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html 135 
 
The Clash of Civilizations
The fundamental source of conflict in the post–Cold
War world will not be primarily ideological or eco-
nomic but cultural. Nation states will remain the
most powerful actors in world affairs, but the prin-
cipal conflicts of global politics will occur between
nations and groups of different civilizations.
By a civilization, I mean the broadest level of
cultural identity short of that which distinguishes
humans from other species. People of different
civilizations have different views on the relations
between God and man, citizen and state, parent
and child, husband and wife, as well as differing
views of rights and responsibilities, liberty and
authority, equality and hierarchy. These differ-
ences are the products of centuries; they will not
soon disappear.
Cultural characteristics are less mutable and
less easily resolved than political and economic
ones. In the former Soviet Union, Communists
can become democrats; the rich can become poor,
and the poor, rich. But Russians cannot become
Estonians, and Azeris cannot become Armenians.
In ideological conflicts, the key question was,
Which side were you on? And people could and did
choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between
civilizations, the question is, What are you? That
cannot be changed.
For a century and a half after the emergence of
the modern international system, Western conflicts
were largely among princes, emperors, and mon-
archs attempting to expand their territories. This
pattern lasted until the end of World War I, when,
as a result of the Russian Revolution, it yielded to
the conflict of ideologies within Western civiliza-
tion. Now, with the end of the Cold War, interna-
tional politics moves out of its Western phase, and
its centerpiece becomes the interaction between
the West and non-Western civilizations.
The most significant dividing line in Europe
may well be the eastern boundary of Western
Christianity in the year 1500. This line separates
Finland and the Baltic states from Russia, cuts
through Belarus and Ukraine, swings westward
separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania,
and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly
along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia
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Samuel P. Huntington, 1927–2008
The eminent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who died on December 24, had been a member of
AEI’s Council of Academic Advisers for many years. His wide-ranging contributions stretched from politi-
cal order in developing countries to civil-military relations and from democratization in postauthoritarian
and post-Communist states to migration and American identity. One of Huntington’s most important con-
tributions of recent years—the thesis that a “clash of civilizations” would become the animating force in
post–Cold War world affairs—was first presented as a Bradley Lecture at AEI on October 19, 1992. It
was, as he said in 1998, his “first opportunity to hold forth on the clash of civilizations before an informed
and critical audience. The article and the book that developed out of that lecture stimulated widespread and
intense discussion and controversy.” 
Below are excerpts from the 1992 lecture and from two tributes to this highly original thinker who
was friend and teacher to many at AEI.
Samuel P. Huntington was a longtime professor at Har-
vard University and a member of AEI’s Council of Aca-
demic Advisers. A version of this article appeared in the
AEI Newsletter and was delivered as a Bradley Lecture. 
January 2009
from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans, this line coin-
cides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg
and Ottoman empires.
The peoples to the north and west of this line are
Protestant or Catholic; they share the common experi-
ences of European history; they are generally better off
than the peoples to the east. The peoples to the east
and south are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically
belonged to the Ottoman or tsarist empires; they were
only lightly touched by events shaping the rest of
Europe. Conflict along the fault line between Western
and Islamic civilizations has been a seesaw for 1,300
years, and it is unlikely to cease.
Historically, the other great antagonist of Arab
Islamic civilizations has been the pagan, animist, and
now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south.
And the conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted else-
where in Asia, and even in the increasingly difficult rela-
tions between Japan and the United States. Reason thus
exists to think that the major conflicts of the future will
be between peoples from different civilizations.
Consider Russia. The question of whether Russia is
part of the West or of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civi-
lization has been a recurring one in Russian history.
The dominance of Communism shut off this historic
debate, but with Communism discredited, that issue
must now be faced. If, after abandoning Marxism, Rus-
sia also rejects liberal democracy, relations between
Russia and the West could become far more distant 
and conflictual.
In the short term, it is clearly in the interests of the
West to promote greater cooperation and unity within
its own civilization, to incorporate into the West soci-
eties in Eastern Europe and Latin America, to promote
cooperative relations with Russia and Japan, and to
limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian
and Islamic states. In the longer term, as the military 
and economic strength of non-Western civilizations
increases, the West must develop a more profound
understanding of these civilizations and expend major
efforts to coexist with them in an increasingly inter-
penetrated global society.
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As the military and economic strength of 
non-Western civilizations increases, the West
must develop a more profound understanding
of these civilizations and expend major efforts
to coexist with them in an increasingly
interpenetrated global society.
The following is an excerpt from an article by Fouad
Ajami in the December 30, 2008, issue of the Wall
Street Journal entitled “Samuel Huntington’s Warning.”
Ajami, who had written the lead critique of Huntington’s
thesis in Foreign Affairs in 1993, admitted later that he
had erred and that “Huntington had been correct all
along.” Describing Huntington’s last book, Who Are
We?, Ajami had this to say:
Huntington lived the life of his choice, neither seeking
controversies, nor ducking them. Who are We? had the
signature of this great scholar—the bold, sweeping asser-
tions sustained by exacting details, and the engagement
with the issues of the time. 
He wrote in that book of the “American Creed” and of
its erosion among the elites. Its key elements—the English
language, Christianity, religious commitment, English
concepts of the rule of law, the responsibility of rulers, and
the rights of individuals—he said are derived from the
“distinct Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding set-
tlers of America.” Critics who branded the book as a
work of undisguised nativism missed an essential point.
Huntington observed that his was an “argument for the
importance of Anglo-Protestant culture, not for the impor-
tance of Anglo-Protestant people.” The success of this
great republic, he said, had hitherto depended on the will-
ingness of generations of Americans to honor the creed. 
We do not have his likes in the academy today. The
patriotism that marked Samuel Huntington’s life and
work is derided, and the American Creed he upheld is
thought to be the ideology of rubes and simpletons, the
affliction of people clinging to old ways. 
Fouad Ajami is a professor of Middle East studies at Johns
Hopkins University. A version of this article appeared in
the Wall Street Journal on December 30, 2008.
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The following is an excerpt from an article by Eliot A.
Cohen in the January 19, 2009, issue of The Weekly
Standard entitled “A Scholar and a Gentleman.” Cohen,
a student of Huntington, remembers his mentor and friend:
Sam’s numerous books and no less important articles (I
still assign a 1962 essay, “Patterns of Violence in World
Politics,” in one of my courses) are a staggering corpus of
work. But they represent only a portion of his legacy. For
Sam has left behind him a vast array of students, in gov-
ernment, journalism, and business, who are what they
are in part because of him.
Sam did not shrink from a fight. In the bad days of
Vietnam, he was heckled and hounded for having done
consulting work for the Department of Defense, and in
later years, he faced the outrage of superficial readers or,
more often, those who thought they knew what he
meant when they had failed to read what he had writ-
ten. Sam did not care, not because he was a callous man,
but because he cared, first, foremost, and always, about
Harvard’s motto: Veritas. The truth mattered, all else 
was secondary. 
A great professor lives after his death in his writings,
to be sure, but as much, and sometimes even more, in
the lives he has touched, the values he has imparted, the
example he has set. So it was with Sam, the revered
teacher, mentor, colleague, and friend of so many stu-
dents who will miss him sorely and strive, in his absence,
to emulate him.
- 3 -
2009-02   #23822
Eliot A. Cohen is counselor of the Department of State and
will return to his position as a professor at Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies on
January 21, 2009. A version of this article appeared in the
January 19, 2009, issue of The Weekly Standard.
